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IS THERE A DOCTOR IN THE HOUSE? 
USING FAILURE-TO-WARN LIABILITY TO 
ENHANCE THE SAFETY OF 
ONLINE PRESCRmING 
CHESTER CIiuANO* 
The ability to obtain prescription medications over the Internet witholll a proper 
prescription has inflamed regulators nationwide. Federal and state officials alike 
have proposed a host of new laws and regulations that attempt to limit this bur-
geoning phenomenon. Yet premature regulation of Internet prescribing cOllld pre-
vent consumers from realizing the tremendous benefits the Internet might one day 
provide to the American health care delivery system. In this Note, Chester Chuang 
argues that subjecting Internet prescribing to a traditional failure-to-warn liability 
framework, rather than to additional regulations, adequately will ensure patient 
safety while allowing for the necessary innovations that will legitimize the distribu-
tion of prescription medications over the Internet. He suggests that pharmacetllical 
manufacturers can satisfy their duty to warn by contractually obligating websites 
that dispense prescription medications to implement comprehensive patient infor-
mation systems. Chuang concludes that the proper application of this framework 
to these patient information systems will make certain that pharmacelllical mantl-
facturen strike the proper balance between patients' health and safety concerns and 
the possibilities of Internet prescribing. 
IN1'RODUCI10N 
The learned intermediary doctrine exempts pharmaceutical com-
panies from the general rule requiring manufacturers to warn consum-
ers of dangers inherent in their products.1 Under this doctrine, to 
fulfill its legal duty to warn, a prescription drug manufacturer need 
only provide adequate warnings about its medications to the prescrib-
ing physician, and not to the ultimate user.2 At its core, the doctrine is 
* Special thanks to Robert L. Rabin for his help in shaping this piece. This Note could 
not have been published without the extraordinary talents of Raclha A. Pathak, Dahlin S. 
Fetouh, Micbael J. Kasdan, Janet R. Carter, Rafael I. Pardo, and the staff of the New York 
University Law Review. Thanks also to Kenneth Hale and Lydia L. Chuang for their re-
search assistance. 
1 See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1274-15 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that 
makers of unavoidably unsafe products have duty to provide proper warnings); Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2(c) (1997) (same). The learned intermediary 
doctrine will be discussed further, see infra Part II.A. 
2 See, e.g., Burton v. American Home Prods. Corp. (In re Norplaot Contraceptive 
Prods. Uab. Litig.), 955 F. Supp. 700, 703 (B.D. Tex. 1997) ("Under the learned intermedi-
ary doctrine, 'when a drug manufacturer properly warns a prescribing physician of the 
dangerous propensities of its product, the manufacturer is excused from warning each pa-
tient who receives the drug. The doctor stands as a learned intermediary between the 
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based on traditional notions of the ideal physician-patient relation-
ship-the physician as a trusted father figure, and the deferential pa-
tient, confident in his care. The explosion of Internet prescribing, 
however, has forced a reevaluation of whether this traditional rela-
tionsbip is the only viable way to prescribe and dispense prescription 
medications. Prescription drugs are freely available on the World 
Wide Web, with or without a prescription, from sites with varying de-
grees of restrictions and reputability.3 In an online world where the 
physician is conspicuously absent, or at best virtual, the learned inter-
mediary doctrine breaks down, leaving pharmaceutical manufacturers 
with the duty to warn the ultimate purchasers of the risks their medi-
cations carry.4 Because of the very nature of prescription drugs and 
the way they are distributed, however, most drug manufacturers are 
currently unable to provide adequate risk information directly to each 
patient.s Therefore, this duty effectively could preclude manufactur-
ers from seIling their products online.6 
This Note argues that manufacturers can satisfy the duty to warn 
that is owed to consumers who purchase prescription medications 
from Internet prescribing sites by contractually obligating the websites 
to implement comprehensive patient information systems. Analyzing 
these systems under a traditional failure-to-warn liability framework 
will allow reputable sites to mature into reliable sources of prescrip-
tion medications for consumers, while cutting off the supply of drugs 
to fraudulent sites without resorting to increased government regula-
tion. Ideally, this framework \ViIl force manufacturers to weigh pa-
tients' health and safety with the commercial and practical advantages 
of Internet prescribing. 
Part I of this Note chronicles the rise of Internet prescribing and 
the increased access to prescription medications it offers the everyday 
consumer. Part II outlines the learned intermediary doctrine and dis-
cusses why it is inapplicable to current online prescribing practices. 
This Part also describes the unique difficulties pharmaceutical manu-
facturers face when trying to implement a direct warning system, but 
manufacturer and the ultimate consumer"" (quoting AIm v. Aluminum Co. of Am.. 717 
S.W.2d 588, 591-92 ('fex. 1986)), aff'd, 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cr. 1999); Krasnopolsky v. 
Warner-Lambert Co., 799 F. Supp.1342, 1346 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (noting that mllDUCacturer"s 
duty is to warn doctor. Dot patient); Wmdham v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 607. 611 
(S.D. Miss. 1992) (same). 
3 See infra Dates 11-20 and accompanying text for a description o[ these websilCSo 
<4 The learned intermediary rule does Dot apply when a prescribing ph)'Sician is absent, 
leaving manufacturers with the legal duty to warn patients direcUy about their medications. 
See infra Part n.c. 
5 For further discussion, see infra Parts lLA, n.c. 
6 See infra Dote 94 and accompanying text. 
i ;.;-
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concludes by arguing that these difficulties should not dissuade manu-
facturers from exploring online prescribing. Part m presents a solu-
tion for conveying adequate patient warnings directly to the patient, 
taking into account the unique challenges that Internet prescribing 
presents. This Part proposes that the application of a traditional fail-
ure-to-warn analysis will enable manufacturers to use the Internet to 
create comprehensive patient information systems that satisfy manu-
facturers' duty to warn in an online prescribing situation. There are 
two ways this might be accomplished: first, by enhancing the online 
physician-patient relationship so that it falls within the confines of the 
learned intermediary doctrine, or second, by implementing Individual-
ized Patient Reports (IPRs) without increasing the physician's role in 
the transaction, thus spurning the protection of the learned intermedi-
ary doctrine completely. Fmally, this Part proposes that manufactur-
ers, and not the government, must require web sites to implement 
either of these systems in order to ensure the success of these patient 
safety measures. 
I 
THE RISE OF INTERNET PRESCRIBING 
Within the last few years, a multitude of pharmaceutical sites 
have emerged on the Internet, selling everything from prescription 
and over-the-counter medications to health and beauty aids.' The ex-
ploding popularity of these sites is closely linked to the development 
of three new, increasingly popular, "lifestyle" medications designed to 
enhance quality of life rather than to cure disease: Viagra, for impo-
tence; Propecia, for hair loss; and Xenical, for weight loss.8 Often, 
patients who wish to take these medications are embarrassed to ask 
their doctors for a prescription and find comfort in the privacy and the 
anonymity afforded them by ordering online.9 The allure of these 
sites is so strong that some experts predict that in the next five years 
7 See Robin Herman, Drugstore on the Net (It's Quick, It's Convenient and It's Un-
regulated. Consumers Run the Risk of Harm With Do-It-Yourself Prescriptions), Wash. 
Post, May 4, 1999, at Z14 ("In the past year, hundreds of pharmaceutical sites have popped 
up on the Internet •..• "). 
8 See Naftali Bendavid, Prescriptions via Internet Pose Dangers: Doctors Fear Pa-
tients Will Skip Supervision, Checkups, Chi. 1li.b., June 16, 1999, § 1, at 1; Sberyl Gay 
Stolberg, On-Line Prescription Practices Create Headache for Regulators, Chi. nib., June 
27, 1999, § 1. at 8 (noting that online prescdbing is tied to emergence of Viagra, Propecia, 
and Xenical). 
9 See, e.g., Bendavid, supra note 8, § 1, at 1 (noting that Internet is attractive to "those 
who may be embarrassed to admit, even to their doctor, that they are impotent or con-
cerned about their baldness or weight"). 
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online sales for prescription drugs and health and beauty products 
may exceed $6 billion.tO 
These websites fall roughly into two categories: "pharmacy-
based" and "prescribing-based."l1 "Pharmacy-based" sites operate 
much like traditional comer drugstores. They are state-licensed and 
require an off-site doctor's prescription before they will dispense 
medications.12 These sites are regulated under conventional food and 
drug Iaws,13 and will thus not be the focus of this Note. "Prescribing-
based" sites, on the other hand, circumvent the traditional models of 
prescription drug distribution. These types of sites further can be cat-
egorized as either Online Consultation or International Freelance 
sites. Online Consultation sites require customers to complete a brief 
medical questionnaire online, usually involving general physical infor-
mation and details of concomitant medication use, which is then re-
viewed by the site's physician, who issues the prescription for the 
requested drug.t4 The medication is then shipped directly by the site 
to the consumer.IS Usually, little information is available about the 
physician's qualifications, with some sites disclosing only that their 
10 See Sarah A Webster, Internet Drug Sales Investigated: Critics Raise Wamiog 
About Health Risks of Online Prescriptions, Detroit News, JUDe 7,1999, at AI, available 
in 1999 WL 3927805. 
11 See Sbari Roan, Your Friendly Neigh~orhood E·Drugstore: lbe New Online Phar-
macies Offer Prompt. Hassle-Free Service, but Health Experts Worry lbat the Sites Also 
Pose Serious Potential for Misuse, LA. 11Dles, Sept 20, 1999, at SI (differentiating be-
tween "pbarmacy-based" and "prescribing-based" sites). 
12 See id. (describing how pharmacy-based sites operate). For CXl1DlpJes of pharmacy-
based sites, see CVS Online Pharmacy Store (visited Sept 17,2000) <bUp:l/w\Yw.a'S.colD>; 
Drugstore.com (visited Sept 17, 2000) <http://www.drugstore.colD>; PlnnctRx Oullnc 
Pharmacy & Drugstore (visited SepL 17,2000) <http://www.plnnctrx.com>. 
13 See Roan. supra note 11, at SI (writing that pharmacy·based sites are "legitimate 
[and] state-licensed"). Pharmacy-based sites require paticnts to send prescriptions to the 
website or will contact directly patients' doctors for prescriptions bcfore dispeosiog medi-
cation, much like mail-order pharmacies. They are regulated under the existing Jaws and 
regulations for mail-order pharmacies. See generally Gregory S. Munro, Regulation of 
Mail-Order Pharmacy, 12 J. Legal Med. 1 (1991) (describing Jaws and regulations gov-
erning maU.-order pharmacies). 
14 See Bemard S. Bloom & Ronald C. Iannacone, Intemct Availability of Prescription 
Pharmaceuticals to the Pub6c, 131 ADnals Intemal Med. 830, 831-32 (1999) (dctaUiog Of-
dering process); Bendavid, supra note 8, § 1, at 1 (same); Hcrman, supra note 7, at Z14 
(same). For examples of On6ne Consultation sites, see 24 Hour Vlllgra and Ptopecia 
Clinic (visited Sept 17,2000) <http://www.24houroullnedrugs.com>; Doctors 2000 (visited 
Sept 17, 2000) <http-JIwww.worldrx.com>; K\VikMed (visited SepL 17, 2000) <http:// 
www.kwikmed.com>; Lifestyle USA (visited Sept 17,2000) <http://w\Vw.liCestyleUS3.colD>; 
Procare Clinic for Men (visited Sept 17,2000) <hUp:l/www.procarecliDic.com>; Viagrn-
Orders (visited Sept 17, 2000) <http://www.futuredrugsemces.com>. 
IS See Lauran Neergaard, Playing Doctor: ODIine Pharmacies Allow PC Users to Skip 
the Physical, Newsday,Jan. 6,1999, at C3 (discussiog types of drugs shippecl from prescrib-
ing-based sites). 
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physicians are licensed in foreign countries.16 International Freelance 
sites are based outside the United States. They do not require a pre-
scription to order medication and do not offer physician consulta-
tion,11 Both types of prescribing-based sites generally include a 
waiver where the consumer releases the site from tort liability by 
clicking the "1 AGREE" button. IS 
Prescribing-based sites afford the consumer around-the-clock 
availability and privacy as well as the promise of lower costs due to 
their reduced operating overhead.19 By eliminating face-to-face visits 
16 See Bloom & Iannacone, supra note 14, at 831-32 (describing lack of information 
available from prescribing-based sites regarding prescribing physicians). For examples of 
sites where the physicians reviewing the online questionnaire are licensed in foreign coun-
tries, see M.E.D. Clinic (visited Sept. 17,2000) <http://www.ukyes.com> (U.K.); Norfolk 
Men's Clinic (visited July 5, 2000) <http://www.viagra.au.com> (Rom.); Pharmcom (visited 
Sept. 17, 2000) <http://www.pharmcom.coIIl> (N.Z.). 
17 See Bloom & Iannacone, supra note 14, at 831-32 (discussing International Freelance 
sites). For an example of a website that does not require an online consultation, see 4nRx 
(visited Sept. 12,2000) <http://www.4nrx.com>; see also DrugQuest (visited Sept. 12, 2000) 
<http://www.drugquest.COIIl> (Internet portal that enables users to purchase prescription 
medications from foreign pharmacies without prescription). 
18 See Bloom & Iannacone, supra note 14, at 831. For examples of these waivers, see 2 
Buy Viagra (visited June 7, 2000) <http://www.nethealthprescriptions.comlorder.html>; 24 
Hour Viagra and Propecia Clinic (visited July S, 2000) <http:// 
www.24houronlinedrugs.comlviagra_waiver.html>; Online Physicians (visited July 5, 2000) 
<http://www.onlinephysicians.netlviagra/consult1.htm>. These types of waivers are termed 
click-wrap agreements. For a thorough explanation of click-wrap agreements, see Jerry C. 
Liu et aI., Electronic Commerce: Using Clickwrap Agreements, Computer Law., Dec. 
1998, at 10. This Note will not focus on the enforceability of these click-wrap waivers, 
though courts historically have viewed negligence disclaimers with much skepticism. See 
Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 Yale LJ. 899, 911 (1994) (noting that 
courts haye tendency to override explicit waivers, especially in health care settings); Nico-
las P. Terry, Cyber-Malpractice: Legal Exposure for Cybermedicine, 25 Am. J.L. & Med. 
327,361-62 & 362 n.282 (1999) (discussing cases where disclaimers have been invalidated 
in health care provider situations). 
This Note also will not focus on the direct liability of the prescribing-based sites them-
selves. Though injured plaintiffs likely will sue both the website and the manufacturer, it is 
assumed that most plaintiffs will focus primarily on the manufacturers' liability due to their 
greater financial resources. For a more thorough explanation of this so-called "deep pock. 
ets" mentality, see Audrey Chin & Mark A. Peterson, Deep Pockets, Empty Pockets: Who 
Wms in Cook County Jury 1iials at vii (1985) (finding that corporate and health care pro-
vider defendants had to pay more than individual defendants paid for similar injuries); 
Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 12 (1988) ("If the 
new tort system cannot find a careless defendant after an accident, it will often settle for a 
merely wealthy one."). But see Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets 
Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 Duke 
W. 217, 262-63 (1993) (finding no support for deep pockets effect). 
19 See Herman, supra note 7, at Z14 (observing that virtual pbarmacies offer "consum-
ers the option of making purchases at any time without having to leave home ••• [and] ship 
products directly from central distributors to customers, avoiding the overhead costs of a 
real storefront"); Roan, supra note 11, at Sl (noting that "online pharmacies hope to lower 
overhead costs and pass on lower prices to consumers"). 
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to physicians and pharmacists, however, such sites may expose con-
sumers to possible adverse drug reactions and other health risks.20 
The recent explosion of prescribing-based sites has state and fed-
eral authorities grappling with difficult enforcement issues. At the 
federal level, the reaction has been one of bewilderment Although it 
is usually a violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act for Ameri-
cans to order medications from a foreign country ,21 the law is ex-
tremely difficult to enforce.22 In fact, Americans have been buying 
drugs illegally from overseas mail-order catalogs for years, albeit in 
much more limited numbers.23 Recently, Representative Ron Klink 
introduced a bill that would require all online pharmacies to post 
identifying information about their doctors, pharmacists, and office 
addresses.24 President Clinton also has proposed legislation requiring 
20 See Bendavid, supra note 8, § 1, at 1 (noting that there is "DO way of knO\\ing if the 
patient is answering the questions truthfully, or if a physical examination would reveal a 
more serious condition"); Herman, supra note 7, at Z14 ("Critics worry that without a face· 
to-face meeting with a doctor, customers can easily lie about their age and health status in 
order to get the regulated products they want •••• "); Roan, supra Dote 11. at SI (indicating 
that American Medical Association believes that "risks in using these prescribing sites are 
overwhelming"); Webster, supra note 10, at A1 (writing that federal and state officials are 
"worried about the health risks to people ordering drugs without a doctor's visit or a pbar~ 
macist's review of potential drug interactions"); see also Bloom & Ianuacone, supra Dote 
14, at 833 (arguing that giving incorrect or false information to obtain prescription from 
one of these sites was "indirectly facilitated by preselected click~(f choices a .. '3i1able to the 
purchaser"). 
21 See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.c. § 381 (1994) (mandating that if 
imported drug appears to be (1) manufactured under unsaoilaIy conditions, (2) forbidden 
or restricted in sale in the exporting couotry, or (3) adulterated or misbranded, sueb drug 
"shall be refused admission"). 
22 See American Med. Ass'o, Internet Prescribing, Board of'Ih1stees Report No. 3S-A-
99 (1999) <http://www.ama~assn.orglmeetiogs/publiclanouaI99/reportslonsiteJbotlrlfl 
bot3S.rtf> [hereinafter Report of the AMA] (DOting that Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) has authority to prevent illegal purchase of prescription drugs overseas. but its ef-
fectiveness has been "extremely limited"); Neergaard, supra Dote 15, at C3 (writing that 
FDA "tries to stop shipments at the border but is largely unsuccessful"); Roben Pear, 
Ooline Sales Spur megal Importing of Medicine to U.S., N.Y. TIDles, .Tan. 10.2000, at At 
(noting that intercepting imported prescription drugs is CA1remely diUicult); New Diet 
Drug Sets Off Medical Frenzy on Internet, Chi. nib. (eveDing ed.), May 24. 1999. at 7 
[hereinafter New Diet Drug1 (same). 
Complicating the issue further. the FDA allows for the importation of certain quanti-
ties of medication for personal use, even those not approved in the U.S. See Food & Drug 
Admin., FDAlORA Regulatory Procedures Manual cb. 9 (rev. May 12.1998). available al 
<http://www.fda.gov/oralcompUanceJeflrpm-.new2lcb9pers.btml>..Ibis exception is sub-
ject to various limitations. See Benten v. Kessler, 799 F. Supp. 281. 284-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(explaining "personal use exception" and limitations thereof) • 
• 23 See Herman, supra note 7, at Z14 (quoting Bill Hubbard. acting deputy commis-
sioner for poliey at FDA, saying: "'We've always bad these catalogues wbere people could 
buy from overseas, but it was a very small market ....... ); New Diet Drug. supra note 22, 
at 7. 
24 See Internet Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act, RR. 2763. 106th Cong. (1999). 
1458 NEW YORK UNWERSITY LAW REVIEW (Vol. 75:1452 
online pharmacies to receive federal certification from the Federal 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in order to dispense medica-
tion over the Web.2S However, since policing Internet prescribing 
would involve the FDA, Federal Thade Commission (FI'C), Customs 
Service, Postal Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, and the 
states, no single agency has clear authority to address the issue uni-
formly.26 In fact, members of the House Commerce Committee re-
cently complained in a letter to the FDA that "the federal effort 
appears uncoordinated and disorganized . . . [and] it remains unclear . 
which federal agencies or departments are in charge, or what the re-
sponsibilities are for each agency."27 Perhaps as a result of these diffi-
culties, the FDA has indicated that the private sector, as well as state 
25 The Internet Prescription Drug Sale Act of 2000 was transmitted jointly to the Houso 
Committees on Commerce and the Judiciary from the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services on June 9, 2000. See 146 Cong. Rec. H4173 (daily ed. June 9,2000); see also Amy 
Goldstein, FDA Bids to Control Online Drug Sales, Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 1999, at At 
(describing Clinton's proposal); Robert Pear, Controls Sought for Drug Sales on the In-
ternet, N.Y. Tunes, Dec. 28, 1999, at Al (same); cf. Naftali Bendavid, Plan to Regulate 
Over-the-Web Drug Sales Draws Fae. Chi. nib .• Dec. 29. 1999. § 1, at 1 (arguing that 
expanding regulation in this area may not be well received). 
26 Guidelines for prescription drugs are set out under the Federal Food. Drug and Cos-
metic Act. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-360ee (1994). The FDA has primary jurisdiction over drug 
labeling (prescription and over-the-counter) and over the advertising and promotion of 
prescription drugs. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-352. 393 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The FfC has 
primary jurisdiction over over-the-counter drug advertising and can block dissemination of 
false or misleading advertising. See 15 U.S.c. §§ 41. 52-53 (1994). Neither agency has 
indicated whether Internet marketing of drugs constitutes advertising, labeling, or both. 
See Kristen Green. Note, Marketing Health Care Products on the Internet: A Proposal for 
Updated Federal Regulations. 24 AID. J.L. & Med. 365. 367 (1998). Doctors, pharmacists. 
and pharmacies are licensed by state boards of medicine and of pharmacy and must follow 
guidelines set out thereby. See. e.g .• Fla. Stat. Ann. § 465.001·.187 (West 1998) (phar. 
macy); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 458.301-.349 (1998) (Physicians); Ind. Code Ann. § 25-26-13·1 to 
-29 (West 1999) (pharmacy); Ind Code § 25-22.5-1-1.1 to -22.5-8 (1999) (physicians): Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 4729.01-.18 (West 2000) (pharmacy); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4731.01· 
.143 (West 2000) (Physicians); Va. Code Ann. § 54.1·3300 to -3319 (Michie 2000) (phar-
macy); Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-2900 to -2941 (Michie 2000) (physicians); Wis. Stat. § 450.01-
.18 (1998) (pharmacy); WIS. Stat. § 448.01-.40 (1998) (physicians). Each state has estab-
lished a Medical Practice Act that defines the process and procedures for granting a health 
professional license. renewing a license. and regulating medical practice within the state. 
See U.S. Dep't of Comm., 'Thlemedicine Repo~ to Congress (Jan. 31. 1997) [hereinafter 
'Thlemedicine]. available at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/telemedllegal.htm>. Control-
ling illegal importation of drugs involves the Customs Service, the Postal Service. and the 
Drug Enforcement Administration. See Drugstores on the Net: The Benefits and Risks of 
On-Line Pharmacies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of 
the House Comm. on Commerce. 106th Cong. 101 (1999) [hereinafter Drugstores on the 
Net] (statement of Janet Woodcock. M.D .• Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Re-
search, FDA). 
'D Robert Cohen, Regulation of Drugs Unraveling on the Web: Authorities Struggle to 
Rein in Business. Star-Ledger (Newark. NJ.). July 6. 1999, at 1. 
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licensing and medical boards, would better be equipped to police pre-
scribing-based sites than the federal govemment.28 
Current state regulations, however, are premised on traditional 
conceptions of prescription drug distribution that fail to address the 
Internet prescribing problem. "Under existing law in the majority of 
states, prescribing prescription drugs to a patient outside the state 
where the physician is licensed is considered the unlicensed practice of 
medicine."29 In addition, most states' laws require licensed doctors to 
establish a physician-patient relationship before prescribing drugs to 
that patient.30 But since doctors, patients, and websites can all be 
28 See Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26. at 95 (statement of Janet Woodcock) ("In 
the context of prescription drug sales over the Internet, government should encourage pri. 
vate sector leadership in achieving a safe marketplace."); Charles Marwick, Several 
Groups Attempting Regulation of Internet Rx, 281 lAMA 975, 97S (1999) (noting that 
"[t]he [FDA] views obtaining prescription drugs without the personal interaction of p:ltient 
and physician as a significant problem but believes that it is one better handled by Slale 
licensing and medical boards than by the FDA"). 
In July 1999, the FDA adopted an Internet Sales Action Plan. See E·Drugs: Who 
Regulates Internet Pharmacies? Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Health, Educa-
tion, Labor and Pensions, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Jane Eo Henney. MoD .. Com-
missioner of Food and Drugs. FDA) [hereinafter Senate Testimony], available at <http:// 
www.fda.gov/olal2000/pharmsales.btml>. The plan includes increased public and proCes-
sional outreach, coordinating state and federal agencies as weD as international agencies, 
monitoring websites involved in drug sales. and sending warning letters to websites. See id. 
29 Report of the AMA, supra note 22. at 3; accord 1Clemedicine. SUpl'll note 26 ("In 
virtually all situations ••• the state has required an out-of·state ph)'Sician to obtain a full 
and unrestricted license before consulting directly with patients in the state. "); JuUe M. 
Kearney, Comment, Telemedicine: Ringing in a New Em of Health Care Delivery, 5 Com-
mLaw Conspectus 289, 297 (1997) ("[M]ost states require a pbysician to obtain a fullli-
cense in order to practice within that state."); Neergaard, supm note 15. at C3 ("It is illegal 
for doctors to prescribe for patients in a state where they're not licensed to Pl'llctice. "); see 
also Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26. at 256 (statement of Herman I. Abromov.ill, 
M.D •• American Medical Association) (expressing concem over dangerous Internet pre-
senDing and encouraging state legislatures and licensing boards to work towards appropri-
ate regulation); Alissa R. Spielberg. Online Without a Net: Physician-Patient 
Communication by Electronic MaD. 25 Am. J.L & Med. 267, 291 (1999) (considering 
states' options for licensure of doctors engaged in telemedicine). 
30 See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 2242(a) (West 2000) ("PresaibiDg ••• without a 
good faith prior examination and medical indication therefor, constitutes unprofessional 
conduct. "); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 334.100(2)( 4)(h) (West 2000) (noting that b03rd may IDe com-
plaint against any pbysician who prescribes drugs "without sufficient examination"); see 
also Report of the AMA, supra note 22 ("[Elvery state medical board agrees that prescrib-
ing drugs without physically examining a patient or reviewing his or her medical records is, 
in most cases. practicing medicine at a level far belo\v the acceptable standard of medical 
care."); Herman, supra note 7, at Z14 ("States require licensed doctors to meet a 'standard 
of care' for a physician-patient relationship that includes personal interaction."): Neer-
gaard, supra note 1S. at C3 ("Licensed doctors ••• must meet standards of care that in most 
states require a patient relationship to prescribe drugs. "). 
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based in different states, state boards of pharmacy and medicine are 
unfortunately ill-equipped to police Internet prescribing.31 
In a piecemeal attempt to regulate these sites, a few states have 
taken action. Illinois passed a law requiring any Internet site that 
ships to a patient in the state to have an Illinois pharmacy license;32 
Nevada's Board of Medical Examiners barred its doctors from making 
Internet sales unless they actually see the patient;33 medical boards in 
WISconsin and Colorado have disciplined doctors who prescribed 
medications to patients they never examined;34 and other states cur-
rently are investigating these sites.35 Enforcement is confounded, 
however, by the fact that few of these sites reveal their geographic 
location, let alone specific identifying information about their physi-
cians.36 In fact, very few doctors or pharmacists have been sanctioned 
for Internet prescribing.37 
The private sector has also moved to address this thorny issue. 
The American Medical Association (AMA) has approved a resolution 
aimed at discouraging doctors from writing prescriptions through an 
Internet consultation.38 Pfizer Inc., the maker of Viagra, has filed a 
complaint with the FTC seeking to stop the prescribing of Viagra 
without adequate safeguards. Pfizer complains that the online ques-
tionnaires used by prescribing-based sites do not adequately convey 
the risks of concomitant use of nitrates, and fail to discover underlying 
medical problems that remain undiagnosed because of the lack of a 
31 See Senate Testimony, supra note 28 ("[M]ost drug sales websites are actually made 
up of multiple related sites and links, thereby making investigations much more complex 
and resource intensive."); Bendavid, supra note 8, § 1, at 1 (noting that state medical and 
pharmacy boards are "poorly equipped to deal with cyberspace, where a patient in one 
state can order pills from a druggist in another state, with the prescription often written by 
a doctor in a third"). 
32 See 22S Dl. Comp. Stat. 85/16-a (West Supp. 2000). 
33 See Herman, supra Dote 7, at Z14. 
34 See id. 
3S See Report of the AMA, supra note 22, at 5 (Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, lUi-
DOis, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming); Hermnn, supra note 7, 
at Z14 (WISconsin and Colorado); Neergaard, supra note 15, at C3 (Connecticut, Wyo--
ming, New Jersey, and Kansas). 
36 See Bloom & Iannacone, supra note 14, at 831-32. 
37 See Bendavid, supra note 8, § 1, at 1 ("[As of June 16, 1999,] fewer than ten doctors 
nationwide, and few if any pharmacists, have been disciplined for prescribing over the 
Intemet"). 
38 See American Medical Association Resolution 832, Guidelines for Medical Practice 
Through the Internet (visited July 8, 2000) <http://www.ama-assn.orgfmeetingsipublicJan-
nual99/reportslonsitelrtflh832.rtf> (stating that "physician[s] should refrain from writing 
prescriptions for medication resulting only from a sale or consultation over the intemet"); 
Cohen, supra note 27, at 1 (discussing shortcomings of formal regulation). 
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physical exam. 3~ Pfizer has also contacted all state medical boards, 
asking them to remind doctors that it is improper to prescribe Viagra 
without examining the patient.40 Drug manufacturers like Pfizer are 
right to be deeply concerned about the inadequate safeguards imple-
mented by prescribing-based sites, since they will not be able to plead 
ignorance of these inadequacies if sued. By law, manufacturers are 
"presumed to possess an expert's knowledge of the arts, materials, 
and processes of the pharmaceutical business."41 This knowledge in-
cludes a familiarity with the distribution and administration of their 
products.42 Though obtaining prescription medication through for-
eign-based websites might be illegal, a line of cases holds that manu-
facturers must anticipate all reasonably foreseeable uses and misuses 
of their products.43 Accordingly, manufacturers can ill afford to wait 
39 See Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26, at 253 (statement or Herman I. 
Abromowitz); Report of the AMA, supra note 22, at 3. 
40 See Bendavid, supra note 8, § I, at 1; Roan, supra note 11, at 51. 
41 Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1277 (5th Cir. 1974); cr. Navarro \'. Fuji Henvy 
Indus., Ltd., 117 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating tbat: 
The fact that as a Japanese firm it may not have known much about Chicago 
driving conditions is irrelevant •••• Fuji intended to sell its cars in the Chicago 
area and is therefore charged with whatever knowledge can rcasonably be im-
puted to automobile manufacturers, wherever located. desiring to servo that 
market.) 
42 See, e.g., Mazur v. Merck & Co., 964 F.2d 1348. 1363 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Prescription 
drug manufacturers are charged with knowledge of the distribution system in which their 
products are sold."); Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1277 (stating that drug manufacturers must be 
familiar "with practices and knowledge common in the drug industry as to distribution and 
administration of pharmaceutical products"). 
43 See, e.g., Gregory v. C"tncinnati Inc., 538 N.W.2d 32S, 329 (Mich. 1995) (stating that 
duty to warn includes foreseeable misuses); Darsan v. Gunca1ito Corp., 545 N.Y.S.2d 594. 
596 (App. Div.1989) ("A manufacturer has a duty to wam or dangers associated \\ith the 
reasonably foreseeable misuse of its producL" (citations omitted»; Tanner Y. Shoupe. 596 
N.W.2d 805,816-17 (WIS. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that whethcr battcry was defective due 
to failure to warn against foreseeable misuse was issue for jury); see also Swa)'le v. McNeil 
Lab., Inc., 8rt1 F.2d 464, 474 (5th Cir. 1987) (Goldberg, J., disscnting) ("[B]oth law and 
morality require McNeil [a pharmaceutical manufacturer] to monitor and cnsure that the 
products it manufactures and markets are Dot generaUy used in an unrcasonably dangerous 
fashion. If this entails some pressure to avoid deaths that McNeil can provent, McNeil is 
required to do no less."). But see Port Auth. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305. 320 (3d CU'. 
1999) ("LP]laintiff can cite no authority (and we can find none) under either New Jersey or 
New York law which supports the existence of a duty to warn middlemen that consumers. 
after purchasing their products, may alter the products and harm third parties."); Gaines-
'Thbb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 F.3d 613, 625 (10th Cir. 1998) ("[D]ercndants bad 
no duty to warn the suppUers of its product of possible criminal misuse. "). 
It is beyond the scope of this Note to determine whether a court indeed would decide 
whether ordering a prescription drug from an International Freelance site was reasonably 
foreseeable and thus apply failure-ta-warn liability. In fact. a court in such a situation may 
hold the plaintiff contributorily negligenL Suffice it to say that it is unchartcd territory IlDd 
the very possibility of such lawsuits should spur manufacturers to take heed. 
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for the government to take action to regulate these sites.44 Even if 
federal and state regulations were successful in inhibiting United 
States~based Online Consultation sites, foreign~based Online Consul-
tation sites and International Freelance sites hardly would be 
affected.4s 
Internet prescribing in its current state presents the courts with a 
scenario beyond the reach of the learned intermediary doctrine. With 
no discernible learned intermediary to rely upon, the courts will be 
forced to assign the duty to warn the patient to manufacturers, leaving 
them open to tremendous liability unless effective warnJngs are 
provided.46 
44 Government regulations may not be the most effective way to police this burgeoning 
phenomenon. RegUlations will be unable to reach International Freelance websites. Sec 
Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26, at 99 (statement of Janet Woodcock) ("The most 
difficult problem to address is the online sale of drugs to U.S. residents by sellers in foreign 
countries."); Bendavid, supra note 25, at N1 ("There is at least one large group that for 
now will remain beyond the reach of regulators: foreign Web sites."); Pent, supra note 25, 
at Al (same). 
Many fear that additional regulations will stifle Internet innovations. See Jolm Hen-
kel, Buying Drugs Online: It's Convenient and Private, but Beware of 'Rogue Siles,' FDA 
Consumer, Jan.-Feb. 2000, available in FDA Consumer <http://www.fda.gov/fdaclfeaturesl 
2000/100_online.html> ("Certain pharmacy industry representatives oppose legislation or 
additional powers for regulatory agencies on the premise that current laws are sufficient to 
address the problem. H); Marilyn Werber Serafini, Drugs on the Web, 31 Nat'l J. 3281, 3311· 
12,3314 (1999) (detailing tepid reaction to additional regulation of Internet prescribing by 
legislators and industry alike); see also Jeri Clausing, Internet Makes an Easy Thrget for 
Lobbyists and Lawmakers, N.Y. TlDles, Nov. 22, 1999, at C1 (arguing that "evolving tech~ 
nolo81 could eliminate the need for rules over domain names disputes and problems liko 
spam"). 
45 See Enforcing the Laws on Internet Pharmaceutical Sales: Wbere Are the Peds? 
Hearings Before Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Com-
merce, l06th Cong. (2000) (statement of William K. Hubbard, Senior Associate Commis-
sioner for Policy, Planning and Legislation, FDA) [hereinafter Hubbard 1Cstimony], 
available at <http://www.fda.gov/olal2000rmtemetsales.html> (stating that: 
[The] FDA confronts the same obstacles facing other U.S. regulatory and law 
enforcement agencies seeking to hold foreign actors accountable for violations 
of Federal law. FDA efforts are mostly limited to requesting the foreign gov-
ernment to take action against the seDer of the product, or asking the U.S. 
Customs Service ••• to stop the imported drug at a U.S. port-of-entry.); 
Herman, supra note 7, at Z14 ("The World Health Organization has considered the 
problems of Internet drug sales, but international action is nearly impossible because of 
different prescription standards in each country."); see also supra note 44 and accompany-
ing text (describing difficulty in policing international websites). 
This problem is not limited to prescription drugs. Various foreign gambling websites 
have been established to evade U.S. jurisdiction. See Mark G. natos, Gaming on the 
Internet, 3 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fm. 101, 107 (1997) ("[MJany virtual gaming operators who 
are beginning to offer services on the Internet are setting up their operations outside the 
United States ••• to avoid criminal prosecution by being located physically outside of the 
jurisdiction of federal authorities. "). 
46 The liability assigned to prescription manufacturers in the absence of the learned 
intermediary rule will be discussed further, see infra Part D.C.l.b. 
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IT 
CIRCUMVENTING THE LEARNED INmRMEDIARY: 
CoNSEQUENCES OF INrERNET PRESCRIBING 
A. The Learned Intermediary Rille 
The learned intermediary rule limits a prescription drug manufac-
turer's duty to warn to "an obligation to advise the prescribing physi-
cian of any potential dangers that may result from the drug's use. "47 
By warning the doctor, the manufacturer relieves itself of any duty to 
warn the users of its products directly.48 As the Fifth Circuit 
explained: 
Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines. esoteric in 
formula and varied in effect. As a medical e"l'ert, the prescribing 
physician can take into account the propensities of the drug, as well 
as the susceptibilities of his patient. His is the task of weighing the 
benefits of any medication against its potential dangers. The choice 
he makes is an informed one, an individualized medical judgment 
bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative.49 
Proponents of the learned intermediary rule stress that it is based on 
"a desire not to intrude upon or disturb the well-established doctor-
patient relationship. "SO Therefore, a physician, using her individual-
ized medical judgment, should be entrusted ,vith selecting the correct 
medication for each patient and specifically tailoring the warnings to 
him or her. Furthermore, courts have assumed that detailed side-ef-
fect information would in fact deter patients from taking the medica-
tion at all, despite their physician's best judgment.S1 Advocates of the 
41 Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Or. 1974); see also Restatement 
('Ihird) of Torts: Products J..iability § 6(d) (1997). . 
48 See, e.g.. Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Lab •• 731 F.2d 1575, 1579-80 (11th Cir. 
1984) (upholding learned intermediary rule); Mauldin v. Upjohn Co •• 697 F.2d 644, 647 
(5th eir. 1983) (holding that manufacturer discharged duty to warn by adequately warning 
physician); Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 661 (1st Or. 1981) (stating that 
manufacturer must warn physician. not patient, of risks involved with prescription drugs); 
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, as (8th Or. 1966) (noting that "doctor is a 
learned intermediary between the purchaser and the manufacturer"). "Ibis is an exception 
to the general rule that manufacturers must warn all foreseeable ultimate users of their 
products of all dangers inherent within them. See Restatement (Third) ofTorlS: Products 
Liability § 2(e) (1997). 
49 Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276. 
so Nancy K. Plant, The Leamed Intermediary Doctrine: Some New Medicine for an 
Old Ailment, 81 Iowa L Rev. 1007, 1015 (1996); accord Swayze v. McNeil Lab .. Inc.. 807 
F.2d 464, 471 (5th Or. 1987) (noting that "warnings would only lead to confusion, and 
perhaps undermine the physician.patient relationship"): Dunkin v. Syntex Lab •• Inc., 443 
F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) (stating that detailed wamiags to patients might "in· 
terfere with the physicianlpatient relationship"). 
S1 See, e.g .. McKee v. American Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045,1055 (Wasb.1989) 
(writing that detailed information "may confuse and frighten the patient"); Lars Noah. 
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rule also argue that it would be extremely difficult to fashion written 
warnings that are easily understood by lay people, yet sufficiently 
comprehensive to cover all of the possible side-effects, which are "in-
herently varied, complex, and dependent upon an individual patient's 
susceptibilities."S2 Even if devising an adequate warning were possi-
ble, pharmaceutical manufacturers must further ensure that it would 
reach patients who often neither receive the drug in its original pack-
aging nor have any significant direct contact with the manufacturer. 53 
B. The Learned Intermediary Rule Revisited 
The learned intermediary rule is premised on traditional concep-
tions of the ideal physician-patient relationship-a relationship that 
has been eroded heavily by the realities of our modern health care 
system. Today's managed care organizations often prevent patients 
from establishing long term relationships with physicians and usually 
provide patients with shorter consultations.54 Numerous FDA studies 
Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Is· 
sues, 32 Ga. L. Rev. 141, 157 (1997) (noting that "warnings that contradict information 
supplied by the physician will undermine the patient's trust in tbe pbysician's judgment"): 
Plant, supra note SO, at 1015 (same); Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescrip· 
tion Drug Advertising and the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 Food Drug Cosm. LJ. 829, 
830 (1991) (same); Catherine A. Paytash, Note, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and 
Patient Package Inserts: A Balanced Approach to Preventing Drug-Related Injury, 51 
Stan. L. Rev. 1343, 1347 (1999) (same). 
52 Paytash, supra note 51, at 1347; see also Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th 
Cir. 1989) (stating that "the information regarding risks is often too technical for a patient 
to make a reasonable choice"); Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227,1232 (4th Cir. 
1984) (noting that direct warnings to patient would be "almost inevitably involved and 
longwinded"); Plant, supra note SO, at 1039-49 (describing rigorous requirements courts 
have imposed for adequate patient warnings); Charles J. Walsh et al.,1be Learned Inter· 
mediary Doctrine: The Correct Prescription for Drug Labeling, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 821, 
839 (1996) ("Given the educational and social differences among consumers, it is difficult if 
not impossible to draft patient labeling which win be beneficial to all users."). 
53 See Plant, supra note 50. at 1015, 1049; Barbara MarticelU McGarey, Comment, 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Consumer·Directed Information-Enhancing the 
Safety of Prescription Drug Use, 34 Cath. U. L. Rev. 117, 147 (1984). Manufacturers usu· 
ally ship their products in bulk containers to the dispensing pharmacy. The pharmacy re-
packages the medication in the quantity prescribed by the phYSician and dispenses it to the 
patient. This will be discussed further, see infra Part ILC.l.a. 
54 See Perez v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, l2SS (NJ. 1999) (noting that since 
"managed care has reduced the time allotted per patient, physicians have considerably less 
time to inform patients of the risks and benefits of a drug"); Plant, supra note SO, at 1024· 
2S ("Patients enrolled in managed care organizations ••• may be less likely to develop a 
long-term relationship with a single physician ••• [and] are likely to spend less time with 
physicians."). As of 1995. 78% of all privately insured Americans were members of man-
aged care plans. See Rand B. Rosenblatt et al., Law and the American Health Care Sys. 
tem 544 (1997). Likewise, over 80% of practicing physicians are employed by, or have 
entered into at least one contractual arrangement with, a managed care plan. See id. at 
557. 
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have shown that "most patients either do not receive information 
about prescription drugs from their doctors or, if they do ••• , they 
often do not understand it or forget it after leaving the office. "ss Ad-
ditionally, managed care organizations increasingly have usurped phy-
sicians' traditional discretion in prescribing decisions.s6 As a result, 
the patient's best interests are often compromised in the face of many 
other competing interests.51 Nonetheless, the learned intermediary 
rule remains widely accepted throughout the judiciary.s8 Because pre-
SS Schwartz, supra note 51, at 831 n.14. For a complete list of these studies, see 45 Fed. 
Reg. 60,754-56 (1980). 
S6 See Rosenblatt et aI., supra note 54, at 568 ("~fanaged care plans] use prospecth'c 
utilization review techniques as well as practice guidelines to control physician utilization 
of resources. Managed care contracts with physicians typically include provisions "'csting 
total discretion in the plan to make medical necessity determinations."); Plant, supra note 
50, at 1026-27 (noting that managed care plans have established formularies (i.e., lists of 
drugs that are covered by plan) of preferred drugs. required prior authorization before 
prescribing drugs not on formulary, required substitution of generic drugs, used monetary 
incentives for physicians to use cheaper drugs, and established protocols that require use of 
drugs in particular order). Managed care plans often threaten physicians uitb exclusion 
from their provider network (thus eliminating the physician's patient base) to compel com-
pliance with these utilization standards. See Rosenblatt et al. supra note 54, at 559. Fi-
nally, some managed care plans reward doctors who provide or arrange for less care. See 
id. at 564. 
Managed care plans have come under increasing attack for '\TongfuUy superseding 
doctors' decision-making authority. See Herdrich v. Pegram. 154 F.3d 362, 376 (7th C"U'. 
1998) (noting that "[i]n order to minimize health care costs and faUen corporate profits for 
HMOs, primary care physicians face severe restrictions on referrals and diagnostic tcsts. 
and at the same time, must contend with ever-shrinking incomes"). rcv'd, 120 S. Ct. 2143 
(2000); Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625. 629 (8th eir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff had right 
to know that HMO was "offering financial incentives that could have colored his doctor's 
medical judgement"); Plant, supra note 50, at 1023 ("Prescribing decisions are increasingly 
made or significantly affected by parties other than physicians, most notably third·party 
payors. n); Amy Goldstein, How HMOs Became the Enemy, Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1999. at 
At (detaiIing complaints levied against HMOs); David E. Rosenbaum, House Hears Grim 
Tales About Managed Care, N.Y. TlDles. Oct. 8. 1999. at A23 (same). But sec Milt 
Freudenheim, Big H.M.O. to Give Decisions on Care Back to Doctors, N.Y. TUDCS. Noy. 9. 
1999, at A1 (noting that United Health Group is allowing doctors to make treatment deci-
sions without first consulting insurer). The House of Representatives recently passed a 
bilJ, H.R.,2723, 106th Cong. (1999). sharply Umiting the ability of HMOs to enforce drug 
formularies and dictate treatment options. See 145 Cong. Rec. 89635-36 (dally ed. Oct. 7, 
1999); see also Robert Pear, House Passes Bill to Expand Rights on Medicn1 Care. N.Y. 
TJDles, Oct. 8,1999, at A1 (describing bill). 
S1 See Plant, supra note 50, at 1031 ("[I]t is erroneous to maintain that the ph)'Sician is 
the sole decisionmaker regarding what drug is prescribed and that the doctor makes this 
decision based solely on what is best for the patient. n). But see Walsh et at. supra note 52, 
at ff/7 n.211 ("rrJhere will be attempts to defeat the learned intermediiU)' doctrine ••• 
because the physician no longer has the freedom to prescribe what is best for the pa-
tient •••• l.N]otwithstanding the restrictions these plans place on physician autonomy. the 
doctor's independent medical judgement should be sufficient to defeat such daims."). 
58 See Noah, supra note 51, at 161 ("[110 date no jurisdiction has completely aban-
doned the learned intermediary rule •••• n). There are Umited exceptions to the learned 
intermediary rule. Some courts have held it inapplicable at mass immunization clinics. 
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scription drugs serve an essential role in the health of our society and 
because in most cases existing physician-patient relationships can still 
provide more effective warnings than the manufacturer can give,S9 ar-
guably, without the protection of the learned intermediary rule, manu-
facturers simply would cease to produce prescription medications 
because the duty to warn consumers directly would be too onerous a 
burden for them to sustain.60 In sum, the learned intermediary rule 
See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 498 F.2d 1264, 1277 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that vac· 
cine is "dispensed without the sort of individualized medical balancing of the risks to the 
vaccinee that is contemplated by the prescription drug exception"); Davis v. Wyeth Lab., 
Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968) (noting that "although the drug was denominated a 
prescription drug it was not dispensed as such"). These cases have been reversed to some 
extent by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300an-1 to -34 
(1994). The Act created a federal no-fault compensation scheme to compensate individu-
als injured as a result of anyone of seven compulsory childhood vaccines. Alternatively, 
plaintiffs can choose to pursue a tort claim, but cannot base a claim on a failure to provide 
direct warnings to an injured party. 
One court has refused to apply the learned intermediary rule to oral contraceptives. 
See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Mass. 1985) (noting that pa-
tients are actively involved in birth control decisions, resulting in limited roles for doctor). 
For other examples of courts that have recognized the oral contraceptive exception, see 
Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989); Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. 
Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich. 
1985). Odgers and Stephens were recently criticized as an incorrect statement of Michigan 
law in Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (E.D. Mich. 1991). Hill was 
repudiated by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 
614 (Ark. 1991). 
A recent salvo against the learned intermediary rule was fired by the New Jersey Su· 
preme Court in Perez v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (NJ. 1999). The court declared 
that "[c]onsumer.directed advertising of pharmaceuticals .•• belies each of the premises on 
which the learned intermediary doctrine rests" and concluded that pharmaceutical manu-
factUrers who utilize direct·to-consumer advertisements also must provide adequate warn-
ings to the consumer within those advertisements. ld. at 1256-57. Courts continue to 
disagree over whether the learned intermediary rule should be applicable in the face of 
direct·to-consumer advertising; indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that 
its decision was in direct conflict with a contemporaneous one by the Fifth Circuit. See id. 
at 1256 ("We acknowledge that the Fifth Circuit recently held that under Thxas law, the 
learned intermediary doctrine does apply in the context of Norplant."). Compare id., with 
Harrison v. American Home Prods. Corp. (In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Linb. Li-
tig.), 165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir.1999) (holding that, although manufacturer was engaged in 
aggressive marketing, "as long as a physician·patient relationship exists, the learned inter-
mediary doctrine applies"). 
59 This will be discussed further, see infra Part ItC.l.a. 
60 See Harrison, 165 F.3d at 379 ("Our understanding of the rationale of the learned 
intermediary doctrine, at least in substantial part, is that it seeks to encourage the drug 
manufacturer to make available prescription drugs despite potentially harmful side ef-
fects."); Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259 ("(M]anufacturers are not made guarantors against re· 
motely possible, but not scientifically-verifiable, side.effects of prescription drugs, a result 
that could have a 'significant anti-utilitarian effect'''); Michael D. Green, Statutory Com-
pliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Refonn 461, 
467 (1997) (writing that product liability claims can cause drug manufacturers to stop re· 
search and development, unnecessarily delay new drugs, or withdraw beneficial drugs); 
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might be viewed as a rough judicial compromise between the commer-
cial interests of the manufacturers, the practical advantages of the 
wide availability of prescription medications, and the health and 
safety of patients. 
Courts facing Internet prescribing-related injury claims, however, 
will find it difficult to apply the learned intermediary rule." It is 
widely recognized that the learned intermediary rule should not apply 
when drugs are dispensed in the absence of a health care provider.6z 
Prescribing-based sites fall squarely within such a situation. In the 
best case scenario, a prescription drug is mailed directly to the pa-
tient's home on the basis of the patient's answers to a brief online 
questionnaire that supposedly was reviewed by an unseen physician. 
At worst, using an International Freelance site, the patient orders the 
medication without even going through the pretense of an online con-
sultation and without ever obtaining a prescription. It is doubtful that 
even at an Online Consultation site, any health care professional bal-
ances the risks and the benefits of specific medications for individual 
patients as originally envisioned by the learned intermediary rule. As 
a result, manufacturers are left with the duty to provide risk informa-
tion directly to any patient that obtains their medications in this 
fashion. 
C. Conveying Adequate Warnings Directly to the Patient 
The most common proposal to convey adequate warnings directly 
from manufacturer to patient is through the Patient Package Insert 
(pPI).63 PPIs are leaflets directly distributed with prescription drugs 
to the patient that describe in lay language the drug's indications, di-
rections for use, and side effects. The FDA currently only requires 
Walsh et aL, supra note 52, at 823 (arguing that "imposing liability ror inadequnte patient 
warnings could adversely affect the availability and affordabllity o[ socially beneficial 
medicines"). 
61 See Terry, supra note 18, at 346 (notiDg that manufacturers who use web marketing 
circumvent learned intermediary). . 
61 See Restatement ('Ibird) of Torts: Products Liability § 6(d) (1997). The drafting 
committee took pains to note that "direct warnings and instructions to patients are war-
ranted for drugs that are dispensed or administered to patients without the personal inter-
vention or evaluation of a health-care provider." Id. at § 6 cmL e; see also Reyes, 498 F.2d 
at 1276 ("rrJhe manufacturer of a prescription drug who knows or has reason to know that 
it will not be dispensed as such a drug must provide the consumer \vith adequate worma-
tion so that he can balance the risks and benefits of a given medication himselL"). 
63 See Plant, supra note SO, at 1032-38 (describing development of patient package in-
serts (PP1s»; Schwartz, supra note 51, at 847 (notiDg that courts should consider requiring 
PPIs for advertised drugs); McGarey, supra note 53, at 14849 (indicating that manufactur-
ers should be obligated statutorily to include PPIs \vith their drugs); Paytasb, supra note 51, 
at 1368 (proposing FDA-mandated program of PPIs). 
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that PPIs be distributed with a small group of medications, including 
oral contraceptives,64 estrogens,6S progestational drug products,66 and 
certain asthma inhalers,67 due to the high degree of patient involve .. 
ment in the decision whether to use such medications, together with 
the potential for severe complications.68 In 1995, the FDA proposed a 
rule requiring drug manufacturers to include "useful" patient informa .. 
tion with seventy-five percent of new prescriptions by 2000 and 
ninety-five percent by 2006.69 Since adequate patient information for 
pharmaceuticals is currently produced for a limited number of medi-
cations, and indeed, extensive patient information has even been in-
corporated into prescription drug advertisements,7° PPIs seem at first 
glance to be an adequate solution to satisfying a manufacturer's duty 
to warn. 
1. An Incomplete Solution 
Advocates of mandatory PPIs, however, continue to envision 
them only as an adjunct form of patient information, secondary to the 
counseling provided by physicians.71 This reluctance to embrace PPls 
as a primary source of drug information stems from two main con-
cerns. First, as a result of the unique distribution system for prescrip-
tion drugs, physicians are in a much better position to communicate 
directly with patients than are manufacturers. Second, the exacting 
judicial standard to which PPIs are subjected results in little actual 
protection from failure-to-warn liability. 
64 See 21 CF.R. § 310.501 (2000). 
65 See 21 C.F.R. § 310.515 (2000). 
66 See 21 C.F.R. § 310.516 (2000). 
67 See 21 C.F.R. § 201.305 (2000). 
6S See Plant, supra note 50, at 1032. 
69 See 60 Fed. Reg. 44,182-44.252 (1995). The FDA previously had proposed expanding 
the PPI requirement to all prescription medications. See 44 Fed. Reg. 40,016 (codified at 
21 C.F.R. § 203 (1981» (1979). The regulation was quickly revoked a few years later. 
mostly due to a lack of support from the health care community. See Revocation of Pa-
tient Package Insert Requirements, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,147, 39,153 (1982): Plant, supra note 
SO, at 1033 (identifying development of voluntary, private-sector patient information pro-
grams as well as administrative pressures to "deregulate" as other reasons for revocation). 
70 For an example, see Roche's full-page advertisement for Xenical, N.Y. Tunes. Oct. 1. 
1999, at A17. 
71 See Noah, supra note 51, at 177 ("[N)o one suggests that PPls should fuUy replace 
professional labeling. "); Schwartz, supra note 51, at 847 (suggesting that PPIs should be 
required in addition to adequate consumer warnings in manufacturers' advertisements): 
McGarey, supra note 53, at 148 ("Even with consumer-directed labeling, the primary re-
sponsibility for informing consumers about their prescriptions would remain with physi-
cians."): Paytash, supra note 51, at 1369 ("[A] comprehensive FDA-mandated system of 
PPIs for all prescription drugs would most effectively complement the information about 
those drugs that patients receive from their doctors."). 
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a. Prescription Drug Distribution. As a result of the distinctive 
distribution system for prescription medications, pharmaceutical man-
ufacturers rarely have an opportunity to communicate directly with 
the end users of their products. Approximately eighty percent of all 
branded prescription products are sold through drug wholesalers.72 
These wholesalers resell the medication to retail pharmacies and hos-
pitals.73 The medication arrives in bulk at the pharmacies where phar-
macists repackage it into smaller quantities, dispense it to the patient 
as directed by a physician's prescription, and provide counseling.74 
Therefore, any mandatory PPI program still ultimately forces manu-
facturers to rely on physicians and pharmacists to distribute the warn-
ings.7S Furthermore, because manufacturers have little information 
on the individual characteristics of a specific patient using their medi-
cation or on the disease state the patient is trying to treat with their 
medication, PPIs must list comprehensively all possible adverse effects 
for all possible patients and treatment scenarios. Since medications 
have multiple indications and side effects that can vary based on the 
dose that is prescribed or even \vith the patient's race or gender, and 
contraindications can differ depending on the patient's concomitant 
drug therapy and other disease states, physicians and pharmacists 
have important roles in individualizing drug warningS.76 Health care 
professionals perform the essential function of sifting through the 
myriad of possible warnings and highlighting the most important ones 
for each individual patient's situation. Without them, a PPI can easily 
"overwarn" a patient, leading to confusion or ungrounded fear in her 
prescribed therapy by flooding her with excessive amounts of inform a-
72 See Sheryl L Szeinbach, Drug Distribution, in Pharmacy and the U.S. Health Care 
System 317, 321 (Jack E. Fmcham & Albert L Wertheimer eds., 2d cd. 1998) ("[A]bout SO 
percent of branded pharmaceutical products were sold through drug wholesalers; 1.3 per-
cent through practitioners; 15.7 percent direct to retaBers, and the rest through other chan-
nels."); Maura J. Monaghan & Michael S. Monaghan, Do Market Components Account 
for Higher US Prescription Prices?, 30 Annals Pharmacotherapy 1489, 1491 (1996) (pro-
viding figure detailing chaDnels of drug distribution). 
73 See Szeinbach, supra note 72, at 321 (listing major customers of wholesalers). 
74 See Kathleen A. Johnson, Emerging Roles for Pharmacists, in PhanDacy and the 
U.S. Health care System, supra note 72, at 217, 235 (noting that dispensing, labeling, and 
counseling are primary components of pharmacy practice). The role of pbarm3cists. how-
ever, is also expanding to encompass "pharmaceutical care." See id. at 226-34 (describing 
"pharmaCeutical care" as emphasizing consultation over dispensing medications). 
75 See Plant, supra note SO, at 1075. 
76 See Noah, supra note 51, at 175 (stating that physicians are best equipped 10 l3i1or 
discussion of drug therapy to needs of individual patients); Paytasb, supra note 51, at 1366 
(discussing ability of physician to taBor warning to patient's individual needs, circum-
stances, and cognitive abilities). 
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tion.77 Thus, within the conventional drug distribution system, the 
health care professional, with or without a mandatory PPI program, 
remains optimally situated to provide the best quality information 
most efficiently to the patient. 
b. An Exacting Legal Standard. In cases that find an exception 
to the learned intermediary rule, manufacturer-provided warnings are 
scrutinized under rigorous failure-to-warn standards.7s In applying 
this analysis, courts begin by assuming that all risks, no matter how 
remote, merit a warning directed to the consumer.79 For example, in 
Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,80 the plaintiff had less than a one in 
a million chance of contracting polio from the manufacturer's vac-
cine.Sl Nevertheless, the court held that failing to warn of this risk 
rendered the vaccine unreasonably dangerous.82 Likewise, the court 
in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 83 while acknowledging that the risk of 
contracting polio from the manufacturer's vaccine was "foreseeable 
77 See Dunn v. Lederle Lab., 328 N.W.2d 576, 580 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) ("[E]xcessive 
warnings on product labels may be counterproductive."); Plant, supra note SO, at 1070·71 
(noting that overwarning may dilute more important warning information); A.D. 1\verskl 
et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Product Liability-Design Defect Comes of Age, 
61 Cornell L. Rev. 495,514-17 (1976) (noting that effective warnings must select carefully 
significant risks to warn about). 
78 See Plant, supra note SO, at 1038·39 (describing failure-to·warn analysis used by 
courts); Schwartz, supra note 51, at 845-46 (arguing that faUure-ta-warn standard without 
learned intermediary rule is exacting and will be difficult to meet). But see Perez v. Wyeth 
Lab. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245,1257 (NJ. 1999) (holding that under New Jersey law, duty to 
warn presumptively is met by compliance with federal labeling). 
79 See, e.g., Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that manu· 
facturer must warn consumer of three million to one risk); Snawder v. Cohen, 749 F. Supp. 
1473, 1475 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (stating that warnings required even if number of consumers 
who may be harmed is not large); McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 530 (Or. 
1974) (writing that defendant has duty to warn of statistically insignificant possibility of 
injury to plaintiff); Plant, supra note SO, at 1042 ("[C]ourts assume, without much analysis, 
either that all risks merit a warning to the consumer, or that a particular risk is significant 
enough to warrant a warning. H); see also James A. Henderson. Jr. & Aaron D. 1\verski, 
Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty SheD of Failure to Warn. 65 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 265, 277 (1990) ("Many courts that acknowledge negligence as the substantive 
basis of failure-ta-warn liability nevertheless insist on bebaving as though strict liability 
were somehow being applied. "); Michael S. Jacobs, Toward a Process-Based Approacb to 
Failure-to-Warn Law,71 N.C. L. Rev. 121, 141 (1992) ("[A] distinct minority of courts 
refuses to accept the basic principle that manufacturers need not warn about remote 
risks."). 
80 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968). 
81 See id. at 130. 
82 See id. at 129-30 (acknowledging that risk was miniscule, yet qualitatively severe 
enough to require warning). 
83 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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statistically, although unknowable individually," nonetheless held the 
manufacturer liable for not warning of the risk.84 
Second, courts demand that printed warnings, even those that en-
compass all possible risks, be worded in a particular way.8S In Mac-
Donald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical COrp.,M Ortho's patient warnings 
stated that "[t]he most serious known side effect is abnormal blood 
clotting which can be fataI."87 Ortho's patient booklet elaborated on 
this statement, describing the clots as life threatening if they "break 
loose and then lodge in the lung or if they form in other vital organs, 
such as the brain."88 Still, the court upheld the jury's determination 
that "the absence of a reference to 'stroke' in the warning unduly min-
imized the warning's impact or failed to make the nature of the risk 
reasonably comprehensible to the average consumer."89 
Third, courts often will ease the plaintiff's usual burden of prov-
ing causation in failure-to-warn cases.90 In typical failure-to-warn 
cases, once the plaintiff has established the manufacturer's duty to 
provide a warning, she then must prove that she "would have read, 
understood, and heeded an adequate warning, thus avoiding the injury 
in question."91 In a prescription drug scenario, however, some courts 
establish a rebuttable presumption in favor of the plaintiff that if she 
had received the warning, she would not have used the product.92 
84 Id. at 1294. 
8S See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 79, at 318-19 & 319 n.220 (listing analogous 
cases); Jacobs, supra note 79, at 149 (noting that: 
By scrutinizing closely the seemingly trivial details of type size, wmuing loca-
tion, and relative degree of expressed urgency, and by permitting outcomes to 
hinge on the presence or absence of one or two seemingly innocuous words. 
courts impose upon manufacturers a duty of virtual perfection. easily 
breached, and satisfied only by chance.); 
Plant, supra note 50, at 1043 (1996) ("[C]ases also impose a significant burden on the mm-
ufacturer to ensure that the warning is artfully worded. ttl. 
86 475 N.E.2d 6S (Mass. 1985). 
frT Id. at 67 0.3. 
88 Id. at 67 0.4. 
89 Id. at 71-12-
!II) See Jacobs, supra note 79. at 162 ("For warnings claims. almost all courts have 
adopted one of two approaches to causation, either of which makes it relatively easy for 
plaintiffs to satisfy their burden of prooL ttl; Plant, supra note SO. at 1049 (writing that wben 
courts require drug manufacturers to warn patient directly, they bave been "deferentinl to 
plaintiffs in establishing the cause-in-fact elementtt). 
91 Jacobs, supra note 79. at 161. 
92 See, e.g., Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co.. 6S1 F.2d 642, 646 n.S (4th Cit. 1931) (SlIlt-
ing that although manufacturer did not have duty to warn ultimate coDSumer, plaintiH 
"would be entitled to the presumption that a warning, had it been given. would have been 
heeded"); Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1265, 1281 (5th Or. 1974) ("Where a consumer, 
whose iojuxy the manufacturer should have reasonably foreseen, is injured by a product 
sold without a required warning. a rebuttable presumption will arise that the consumer 
would have read any warning provided by the manufacturer, and acted so as to minimize 
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Even those courts that have not granted such a presumption have em-
ployed a subjective standard for establishing causation, allowing the 
plaintiff to testify as to whether she would have heeded an adequate 
waming.93 
Critics complain that applying such demanding standards to pre-
scription drugs overdeters prescription drug manufacturers, thereby 
reducing the availability of medication.94 Indeed, under these stan-
the risks."); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 838 (Ohio 1981) ("(\V)here no 
warning is given, or where an inadequate warning is given, a rebuttable presumption arises, 
beneficial to the plaintiff, that the failure to adequately warn was a proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's ingestion of the drug."); Jacobs, supra note 79, at 162 ("[A rebuttable presump-
tion] frees plaintiffs from the obligation to prove either their general inclination to read 
and obey product warnings or the fact that they have actually done so in the particular 
case. "); Plant, supra note 50, at 1050 ("In some cases when courts have held that the mllnU-
facturer had a duty to warn the patient directly, the patient is aided by a rebuttable pre-
sumption: if he would have received the warning, he would not have used the product."); 
Schwartz, supra note 51, at 847 ("Some courts, recognizing the difficulty of proving causa· 
tion in warning cases, have created a rebuttable presumption of a causal Iinkllge in such 
cases."); cf. also Henderson & 1\verski, supra note 79, at 278 ("Many courts have held that 
when the defendant fails to provide an adequate warning, it is presumed that such a warn-
ing would have been read and heeded by the user had it been given."). 
93 See MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 72 (stating that: 
The jury were free, however, to credit MacDonald's testimony that she would 
not have used the pills had she been advised of the danger of 'stroke,' and to 
infer that an explicit reference to the risk of stroke might tip the balance in a 
reasonable person's choice of a contraceptive method.); 
Jacobs, supra note 79, at 162-63 (stating that courts that do not use rebuttable presumption 
"employ a subjective standard for establishing causation, allowing a plaintiff to testify-
after the fact of his injury, of course-as to whether he would have read and heeded an 
adequate warning had the defendant placed one on its product"); Plant, supra note SO, at 
1053 (noting that courts grant plaintiffs "considerable leeway in showing that on adequate 
warning would have changed [their) decision[s]"); see also Henderson & 1\verski, supra 
note 79, at 305 ("A plaintiff typically can offer little more than self-serving testimony Dnd 
anecdotal evidence to establish her proximate causation case."). 
94 See Green, supra note 60, at 467 (identifying arguments that tort law results in 
overdeterrence that may cause beneficial drugs to be withdrawn from marketplace): W. 
Kip VISCUSi et aI., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Ratio-
nale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1437,1470-71 
(1994) (arguing that imposition of liability has induced manufacturers to leave vaccine 
market altogether); Walsh et at., supra note 52, at 874 (noting that if enough jurisdictions 
had accepted direct duty to warn standard for oral contraceptives, standard may have 
driven them off market or made them substantially less affordable). But see Teresa Moran 
Schwartz, Prescription Products and the Proposed Restatement (Third), 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 
1357,1401 (1994) (finding little evidence of liability system's adverse impact OD pharma-
ceutical industry). 
Various alternatives to traditional fallure-to-warn analysis, such as a regulatory com-
pliance defense, have been proposed_ See Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong" 
Regulatory Compliance Defense, 5S Md. L Rev. 1210, 1213 (1996) ("[A] strong regulatory 
compliance defense would .•• more than offset any negative effects that the defense might 
have on product safety and victim compensation."); Green, supra note 60, at 508 (writing 
that FDA regulatory compliance defense is not "unproblematic"): Henderson & 1\verski, 
supra note 79, at 270 ("Concepts such as risk foreseeability, risk-utIlity balancing, and 
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darcls, manufacturers cannot realistically rely on the distribution of 
PPIs to fulfill their duty to warn in the context of Internet prescribing 
situations. When the consumer orders a medication from a prescrib-
ing-based site, it is dispensed with little physician interaction and 
shipped directly to the consumer. Because the PPI would become the 
patient's primary source of information without a health care profes-
sional readily available to interpret it, the usual worries that accom-
pany PPIs are heightened. Thus, the PPI is a particularly unrealistic 
solution to bridge the warning gap so prevalent in online prescribing 
transactions. Moreover, the exacting liability standards used to ana-
lyze PPIS95 may deter manufacturers from relying on them at alt, nec-
essarily precluding them from selling medications online unless other 
realistic direct-warning systems can be designed. In sum, tremendous 
concerns abound regarding both patient safety and the ability of drug 
manufacturers to insulate themselves sufficiently from liability, threat-
ening the continuing viability of Internet prescribing and distribution. 
2. The End of Internet Prescribing? 
A well-run prescribing based site-operating within the contours 
of healthy physician-patient relationsbips-could offer certain seg-
ments of the population distinct practical advantages over brick and 
mortar doctors' offices and pharmacies. These advantages include un-
paralleled access to health care providers both nationwide and world-
wide, the convenience of around-the-clock availability, increased 
privacy, and lower costs.96 Additionally, the tremendous autonomy 
proximate causation are so devoid of content in the failure·ta-warn context that they can-
not hope to test the bona fides of the plaintifPs claim. H); Peter Huber. Safety and the 
Second Best The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 8S Colum. L. Rev. 
277,335 (1985) ("Requiring-or at least strongly encouraging-the courts to respect the 
comparative risk choices made by competent, expert agencies would inject a first. small 
measure of rationality into a judicial regulatory system that currently runs quite v.ild. ")i 
Jacobs, supra note 79, at 177 ("Because the content-based approach to warnings law has 
failed, courts need to replace their minute inquiries into the details of risk and adequacy 
with a method of analysis that focuses on the procedures used by the manufacturer prior to 
the adoption and publication of its warning inCormation.")i Plant, supra note 50. at 1010 
("Principles should be adapted from the informed consent context to modify the obliga-
tions of pharmaceutical manufacturers so as to accommodate the unique nature of pre-
scription drugs and medical devices."); Teresa Moran Schwartz, '!be Role of Federal Safety 
Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 Vande L. Rev. 1121, 1168 (1988) (arguing that 
"federal regulatory standards should Dot be treated as conclusively or presumptively ade-
quate measures of safety under the common law"): VISCUSi et aL, supra, at 1439 (Slating 
that "tort liability should be limited through federallegistation"). The appropriate state of 
failure-ta-warn doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note; the risk of pOlentilllliability is 
the emphasis here, not how that liability will be, or should be, determined. 
9S See supra DOtes 78-93 and accompanyiDg texL 
96 See Hubbard 'Iestimony, supra Dote 45 (detailing the "mIlDY" bencfilS of prescription 
drug sales over the Internet); Senate Testimony, supra note 28 (noting that benefilS include 
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the Internet provides patients can spur them to learn more about their 
medical conditions and history as well as to research their medications 
more thoroughly.97 More generally, the lessons learned from develop-
ing effective prescribing-based sites can help harness the Internet as a 
tool to streamline the massive information exchanges between physi-
access to drugs for the disabled or otherwise home-bound, for whom a trip to 
the pharmacy can be difficult; the convenience of shopping 24 hours a day; an 
almost unlimited number of products for customers; and privacy for those who 
don't want to discuss their medical condition in a public place); 
Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26, at 96 (statement of Janet Woodcock) (illegitimate 
prescription drug sales on the Internet can provide tremendous benefits to consumers."); 
American Med. Ass'n, Guidelines for Medical Practice Through the Internet, Resolution 
832 (1999) <http://www.ama-assn.org!meetings/publiclannuaI99/reports/onsite/rtflh832.rtf> 
(stating that Internet medicine may be used "to reduce cost and improve access to health 
care delivery by preventing unnecessary patient travel"); Barbara J. 'lYler, Cyberdoctors: 
The Vlt1ual Housecall-The Actual Practice of Medicine on the Internet Is Here; Is It n 
Telemedical Accident Waiting to Happen?, 31 Ind. L. Rev. 259, 278 (1998) (U[P]roblems of 
unequal treatment of rural and urban patients can be dealt with using telemedicine as n 
conduit to deliver these services."); Ellen Almer, Online Therapy: An Arm's-Length Ap-
proach, N.Y. TlIDes, Apr. 22, 2000, at Al (noting that: 
Some experts on mental health agree that online counseling, through e-mail, 
real-time e-mail exchange, and eventually video conferencing, is one of the 
most prOmising developments of the maturing Internet because it opens up 
new treatment options to people in remote areas, the disabled and those who 
feel too stigmatized to seek treatment for mental illnesses.). 
Such advantages might be particularly beneficial to the estimated 38.5 million Americans 
without health insurance and the estimated 43 million Americans living in "medically un-
derserved" areas. See Rosenblatt et al., supra note 54, at 38, 40. 
97 See Nancy K. Plant, Prescription Drug Promotion on the Internet: Tool for the In-
quisitive or nap for the Unwary?, 42 St. Louis U. LJ. 89, 155-56 (1998) (stating that: 
In light of the changes in the healthcare system ••• patients must take more 
responsibility for their own healtbcare. Physicians.. . have their own set of 
conflicting interests to worry about ...• In order for patients to manage their 
own healthcare responsibly, they must be able to obtain information and use it 
appropriately.); 
Plant, supra note SO, at 1036 ("Patients are increasingly interested in and receptive to infor-
mation about their diseases and possible modes of treatment."); William M. Silberg et al., 
Assessing, Controlling, and Assuring the Quality of Medical Information on the Internet: 
Caveat Lector et Viewor-Let the Reader and Viewer Beware, 277 JAMA 1244, 1244 
(1997) ("[T]he Internet hosts a large number of high-quality medical resources and poses 
seemingly endless opportunities to inform, teach, and connect professionals and patients 
alike."); 'lYler, supra note 96, at 269 ("The necessity for information for one's diagnosis or 
medical options has never been more obvious than now when consumers are faced with 
government and medicare funding cutbacks, hospital closings, waiting lists for surgical pro-
cedures, and doctors' and nurses' strikes."): David J. Morrow, Health Care Consumers 
Can Expect Change, and a Shock or 'lWo, N.Y. Tnnes, Dec. 20, 1999, at C6 ("One of the 
biggest changes during the next 10 to 20 years is expected to be the increasing role of tbe 
patient in choosing his or her treatment. Instead of relying only on their doctors' advice, 
consumers will also use medical information from the Internet and prescription-drug ad 
• It) campugDS .. 
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cians, insurers, pharmacies, and manufacturers now conducted on 
reams of paper forms.98 
The AMA also has identified at least three situations in which 
Internet prescribing may be used for legitimate electronic prescribing 
purposes.!19 For instance, after a physician examines a patient, she 
could enter a prescription order online for that patient and transmit it 
online to the pharmacy.lOO Alternately, if a patient has been and re-
mains under the care of a physician, and has been seen in person by 
the physician in the recent past, the patient could contact electroni-
cally the physician when no refills remain on a previous prescription, 
and the physician could authorize the renewal online to the pha.r-
macy.10l Fmally, the AMA notes that it may be appropriate for a phy-
sician to consult a patient online and issue that patient a new 
prescription pursuant to that online consultation if the physician has 
an ongoing relationship with the patient, has the patient's medical his-
tory and physical information available at the time of the consultation, 
and has seen the patient in the recent past. In this limited situation, 
new prescriptions for particular medications legitimately may be 
transmitted online to the pharmacy without an additional office 
visit.102 In light of these potential advantages, the AMA has stated 
that "[c]are must be taken to protect and even enhance legitimate 
electronic prescribing and dispensing practices."103 Therefore, it is im-
portant that prescribing-based sites are not abandoned merely be-
98 See Tyler, supra note 96, at 289 ("The benefits of on-line teleconferencing and con-
sultations as well as the on-line practice of medicine in this era of limited health care dol-
1m and managed care are inestimable!'). Healtheon/Webf\ID. an Intemet-based 
company, has already announced plans to link patients, doctors. and insurers online. See 
Milt Freudenheim, Confronting the Reality of a Health Care VISion, N.Y. Tunes. Feb. 28. 
2000, at Cl ("The potential market is a mindboggling 30 billion health care transactions 
annually."); see also Alissa R. Spielberg. On Call and Online: Sociohistorical. Leglll. and 
Ethical Implications of E-Mail for the Patient-Physician Relationship, 280 lAMA 1353, 
1353 (1998) ("[E]-mail has the potential to reach every physician and in turn to lllter all or 
a physician's subsequent relationships. "). 
99 See Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26, at 2SS (statement or Hennan I. 
Abromowitz); Report of the AMA, supra note 22, at 8. 
100 See Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26. at 2SS (statement or Hennan I. 
Abromowitz). 
101 See ide 
102 See ide (using example of prescn"bing antihistamine pursuant to electronic 
consultation). 
103 Id. Unfortunately, legitimizing prescn"bing·based sites may enable some bad actors 
to obtain drugs fraudulently. Yet even under our current drug distributioD S)'Stem, bad 
actors can lie to their doctors and forge prescriptions to procure medication improperly. 
'Ibis Note does not consider whether such. fraud wD1 be pervasive enough to outweigh the 
benefits of online prescribing. Using a strict failure-la-warn liability analysis to limit the 
types of drugs available online, see infra Part m, however, should prevent the most prob-
lematic drugs from being marketed in this way. 
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cause of the inability of our current regulatory system to police the 
safety of these transactions.104 
Only by improving prescribing-based sites and forcing them to 
operate responsibly, either by expanding the involvement of a doctor 
with the online transaction or by increasing the quality of the patient 
information provided, can their vast potential be realized.1os Unfortu-
nately, it is doubtful whether legislative or administrative mandates 
effectively could compel these websites, notorious for their ability to 
evade regulation, to reform their prescribing methods.106 Further-
more, given the rapid pace of change within the Internet, such regula-
tions likely will be obsolete before they are promulgated.t07 Finally, 
any proposed solution must ensure that both domestic and foreign 
websites will act to increase the safety of their transactions. 
III 
ENHANCING THE SAFETY OF ONLINE PRESCRIBING: 
A PROPOSAL 
This Note proposes that pharmaceutical manufacturers them-
selves are optimally situated to improve the operation of prescribing-
based sites. Frrst, manufacturers can utilize the capabilities of the In-
ternet to create comprehensive patient information systems that con-
vey adequate warnings directly to the online patient. Scrutinizing 
patient information systems under a traditional failure-to-warn liabil-
ity framework would increase effectively the quality of patient care 
provided by web sites without imposing an absolute ban on online pre-
scribing. Second, to ensure that warnings will be distributed by web-
sites regardless of where in the world they are based, the 
manufacturers, and not the government, must obligate websites to im-
plement these systems. By balancing manufacturers' commercial in-
104 See Cohen, supra note 27, at 1 ("'The regulatory system for drugs was created at a 
time when the Internet was not envisioned.'" (quoting William Hubbard, deputy associate 
commissioner of FDA». See generally Bendavid, supra note 25 (arguing that current regu-
latory scheme is largely outdated). 
lOS See Spielberg, supra note 98, at 1358 ("[B]lectronic communication, as a novel tech-
nology, is neither inherently unethical nor readily acceptable for medical practice. Rather, 
the emergence of electronic communication launches a reexamination of the necessary val-
ues for good communication in the patient-physician relationship."); Terry, supra note 18, 
at 350 (describing various ''new manifestations of cybermedicine"); 'lYler, supra note 96, at 
283 ("Telemedicine could result in revolutionary changes in our health care delivery sys-
tem. tI): Morrow, supra note 97 ("Health experts are confident that drugs win routinely be 
bought through the Internet, including treatments for serious conditions."). 
106 See supra notes 22-37 and accompanying text. 
107 See Green. supra note 26, at 368 (arguing that regulating Internet is "unlikely to be 
successful given that rapid technological advances can render such regulations obsolete by 
the time they are published"). 
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terests in online prescribing, the practical advantages to consumers of 
online prescribing, and the health and safety concerns of patients, this 
proposal provides manufacturers with an economically viable way to 
enhance the safety of online prescribing. 
A. Conveying Adequate Warnings Directly to the Patient: Revisited 
The Internet can be used to create comprehensive patient infor-
mation systems that improve the quality of the warnings conveyed to 
the online patient. Analyzing comprehensive patient information sys-
tems under traditional faiIure-to-warn liability, and indeed, even 
under the learned intermediary rule, will encourage safer forms of In-
ternet prescribing. This Section suggests two approaches to satisfying 
manufacturers' duty to warn: enhancing the online physician-patient 
relationship or distributing Individualized Patient Reports (IPRs). 
1. Enhancing the Online Physician-Patient Relationship: Extending 
the Learned Intermediary Rule 
Increasing the amount of physician interaction given to the pa-
tient on each transaction is one way of enhancing the quality of pa-
tient information provided in the Internet prescribing conteh1. 
Instead of merely presenting a prospective patient with an online 
questionnaire, for example, a website could implement an instant mes-
saging system to allow the patient and a physician to interact with 
each other in real time.lOS Such an information exchange, albeit vir-
tual, would resemble more closely a face-to-face examination in a phy-
sician's office than the typical online questionnaire. The physician 
would be able to ask all of her questions in real time and immediately 
receive the patient's answers, much as if they were speaking by tele-
phone. If a court is convinced that the online information excbange is 
comprehensive enough to constitute a true physician-patient relation-
ship and that the drug is dispensed according to an individualized 
medical judgment, then it should apply the learned intermediary 
108 Instant messaging allows users to converse online at the pate of a normal convcrsa-
tion. For an example of instant messaging, see leQ (visited July S. lOGO) <http:// 
www.icq.com>.This type of physician-patient communication already is being imple-
mented by CyberDocs, (visited July 8, 2000) <http://\V\Vw.cyberdocs.com>, which offers 
physician consultations through audio-video comerencing and/or interactive kcyboard 
chat. There are also websites offering psychiatric counseling and treatment online. See 
here2listen.com (visited July 8. 2000) <http://w\Vw.here2listca.com>;meatalbealthline.com 
(visited July 18. 2000) <http://www.mentalhealthline.com>;seealsoJonathanMandeD.lt·s 
Often Hard to Find Help Behind the Cybercounter, N.Y. TIDIes. Dec. 2. 1999, at G7 (dis-
cussing provision of customer service via interactive chat). 
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rule.109 By extending the learned intermediary doctrine to cover such 
situations, courts would provide manufacturers with an incentive to 
develop these higher quality online information exchanges. Ex-
panding the learned intermediary rule to protect websites that imple-
ment enhanced online physician-patient relationships will encourage 
the development of Internet prescribing into a reliable source for pre-
scription drug consumers. 
While a virtual examination may not be the ideal traditional con-
sultation originally envisioned by the learned intermediary rule, our 
modem health care system has eviscerated the traditional physician-
patient relationship.l1O Despite this, courts have continued to apply 
the learned intermediary rule, even in situations where the plaintiff 
argues that the physician-patient relationship was subpar.lll In 
Swayze v. McNeil Laboratories, inc.,112 the plaintiff's son died from an 
overdose of prescription anesthetic administered by a nurse anesthe-
tiSt.113 Though the nurse "testified that he alone determined the dos-
age,"114 the court found that since the physician "was present at all 
times ... he assumed the role of 'learned intermediary.' "115 Similarly, 
in Bacardi v. Holzman,116 the court applied the learned intermediary 
rule notwithstanding the plaintiff's claim that "he did not even know 
109 If the current state of technology does not allow online information exchanges be-
tween pbysician and patient to rise to the level of a face-to-face consultation, courts should 
assign the duty to warn patients to the manufacturers. The manufacturers either will halt 
online sales or attempt to develop better ways to warn patients about their medications. 
For a thorough explanation of how a drug manufacturer should weigh liability risks. see 
Swayze v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 477·79 (5th Cir.1987) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
The learned intermediary rule "carrot," however, will remain, encouraging manufacturers 
who wish to sell their medications online to develop the technology that will someday 
enable online information exchanges to become and be deemed true physician'patient 
relationships. 
110 See supra Part II.B. 
111 See, e.g., Pumphrey v. c.R. Bard, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 334, 339 (N.D. W. Va. 1995) 
(plaintiff argued that hospital setting did not allow for adequate communication between 
herself and surgeon); KrasnopoJsky v. Warner-Lambert Co., 799 F. Supp. 1342, 1342 
(B.D.N.Y. 1992) (plaintiff argued that doctor had examined him in impersonal clinical set-
ting); Bacardi v. Holzman, 442 A.2d 617, 619 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (plaintiff 
argued that none of many different doctors he had seen at various clinics and hospitals 
individually had balanced risks involved); Taurino v. EUen. 579 A.2d 92S. 926 (pa. Super. 
Ct. 1990) (plaintiff claimed that oral contraceptive was dispensed by cUnic without inter-
vention of physician). 
112 807 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1987). 
113 See id. at 465. 
114 Id. at 466. 
115 Itt. at 470. In a noteworthy dissent, Judge Goldberg argued that "[t]he fnUure of a 
doctor to exercise his fiduciary duty to supervise care and to prevent unqualified per-
sons ••• from prescribing fentanyl cannot be consistent with performing a 'learned inter-
mediary' role." Id. at 473 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
116 442 A.2d 617 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981). 
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the names of some of the physicians who had treated him."1l7 The 
plaintiff in Taurino v. Ellen118 argued that she was "supplied the drug 
by an employee of the clinic who was not a doctor. "119 The court 
stated that "[e]ven assuming that [the plaintiff] was originally given 
Loestrin without the intervention of a physician[,] ••• a physician did 
note that [the plaintiff] would take Loestrin before she began taking 
it,"120 and applied the learned intermediary rule.121 
For many of the reasons discussed in Part IT.A, courts are loath to 
disregard the learned intermediary rule even in situations where the 
quality of the physician-patient relationship is tenuous at best.l22 The 
continued availability of medication on the Internet, if within vigi-
lantly controlled confines, should be afforded no less protection. Ap-
plying the learned intermediary rule to an online physician-patient 
relationship merely forces courts and manufacturers alike to examine 
carefully every aspect of the online relationship to ensure that it is 
similar in quality to a face-to-face consultation.l23 For guidance on 
how to apply this standard, courts should look to the AMA's mini-
mum. standards of care.124 If the court is satisfied that the online phy-
sician-patient relationship established by the prescribing-based site 
meets these criteria, it should extend failure-to-warn immunity to the 
manufacturer as long as it properly warned the online prescribing doc-
tor. To conduct that analysis, a court should consider whether the 
doctor performed a thorough examination to determine whether an 
actual medical problem existed and to make a specific diagnosis. Sec-
ond, there must be a dialogue between the physician and the patient 
to discuss treatment alternatives and to determine the best course of 
treatment. 'Third, the physician must effectively establish, or have 
ready access to, a reliable medical history. Fourth, the physician must 
117 Id. at 619. 
118 579 A.2d 925 (pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
119 Id. at 926. 
120 Id. at 928. 
121 See id. at 930. 
122 See Plant, supra note 50, at 1054 ("[T]he doctrine better accommodates the presaip. 
tion drug context than the application of traditional products liability failure-ta-warn prin-
ciples. Physicians may no longer have primary control over prescribing drugs. and 
consumers may have a greater need for more information about drugs; however. presaip. 
tion drugs are still not a typical consumer product. H). 
123 Cf. Paytash, supra note 51, at 1364 ("It does not fonow that because a more personal-
ized doctor/patient relationship is preferable and ideal, that the lack of such a relationship 
renders medical decisions inadequate."). 
124 See Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26, at 254 (statement of Herman I. 
Abromowitz) (outlining American Medical Association'S minimum standards of care)i Re-
port of the ~ supra note 22, at 5 ("[Ilt is important to stress that the use of the in-
ternet does not obviate the physician's obligation to meet appropriate standards of care 
when dealing with patients."). 
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provide adequate warning information to the patient. Finally, in cer-
tain cases, follow-up care will be necessary and the site will have to 
implement systems to make that possible.l2S 
The promise of a safe harbor from failure-to-warn liability will 
encourage a manufacturer to screen carefully the websites it sells its 
products to and to work with those websites to develop enhanced on-
line physician-patient relationships. Certainly, there will be drugs that 
are so complex that no amount of online information exchange will 
adequately inform the patient of the risks involved.126 In such cases, it 
will be unreasonable for the manufacturer to have relied on an online 
physician to provide sufficient information for the specific drug; it sim~ 
ply should not be dispensed online. However, there are many other 
medications that could be prescribed and dispensed safely online. By 
balancing patient safety concerns with the advantages of Internet pre-
scribing, and then instituting proper safeguards, a certain number of 
prescribing-based sites will be improved markedly, allowing the public 
to benefit from a new, safe model of drug distribution. 
2. Leaving the Learned Intermediary Behind: A More Radical 
Proposal 
As an alternative to bolstering the online physician-patient rela-
tionship, manufacturers might help the websites to distribute en-
hanced patient warnings that improve upon the traditional PPI. Such 
a model assumes that a physician would issue the prescription pursu-
ant to an online questionnaire much as they do now, with minimal 
patient interaction; therefore, the shield of the learned intermediary 
rule would be inappropriate. The website, however, could provide the 
patient with Individualized Patient Reports (IPRs) to compensate for 
the reduced role of the prescribing physician. Since these IPRs will be 
examined closely under a traditional failure-to-warn liability frame-
work, manufacturers will have strong incentives both to design opti-
mal warnings and to consider carefully which types of medications to 
allow to be distributed in this way. 
us See Drugstores on the Net, supra note 26, at 254 (statement of Herman I. 
Abromowitz). 
126 Determining which medications could be appropriate for online prescribing would 
involve extensive therapeutic expertise; these reasonableness determinations probably will 
rely primarily on expert medical testimony. For a list of medications that one website has 
indicated as "inappropriate for online prescribing," see CyberDocs (visited July 8, 2000) 
<http://www.cyberdocs.comlnonprescribed.htm>. The list is primarily composed of con-
troDed substances and is therefore not as weD thought out as a court would requIre. It is 
presented merely as an oversimplified example. 
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a. Individualized Patient Reports. (1) Comprehensive Patient 
Information Reports: Under this proposal, manufacturers, in conjunc-
tion with the FDA, should first fashion comprehensive patient infor-
mation reports for all of the medications to be sold on prescribing-
based sites. This process could mimic the one already in place for the 
approval of the contents of a new drug's professional labeling, which 
requires manufacturers to submit to the FDA "a great deal of infor-
mation about how the drug should be used, and safety-related infor-
mation that includes contraindications, known adverse effects, and 
precautions in usage to avoid identified risks."127 For most approved 
prescription medications, this information is already found on the 
drug's package insert. The bulk of the work would be translating this 
wealth of complex medical information into language readily compre-
hendible by lay persons. 
(2) The Online Questionnaire: Once the report is created, the 
manufacturers should implement a standard online questionnaire to 
be used by the prescribing-based sites. Any individual characteristics 
that physicians would find pertinent in making their prescribing deci-
sions, such as sex, race, age, weight, allergies, and blood pressure 
should be included in the questionnaire. In addition, manufacturers 
should include other more esoteric characteristics that are material in 
light of the particular drug being prescribed. The questionnaire must 
also contain a section where the patient can indicate any other medi-
cations she currently is taking. Creating the ideal questionnaire will 
be much like creating the ideal report, in that it will involve a careful 
balance between brevity and detail. It should not be overly lengthy, 
lest it tempt patients to skip parts of it, but it must be detailed enough 
to allow for as much individualized profiling as possible. 
(3) Individualization: By using the patient's answers to the on-
line questionnaire, the website could create an individualized profile 
of the patient.128 The IPR then could customize itself to conform to 
the answers provided in the questionnaire, emphasizing the informa-
tion that a patient fitting that profile would find most material.129 For 
example, depending on whether the patient for which the drug was 
127 Green, supra note 60, at 488; see also 21 c.F.R. §§ 601.2, 6D1.12, 6Dl.25 (2000): 
VJScusi et at., supra note 94, at 1440-46 (describing FDA's approval process Cor drug 
labeling). . 
128 For examples of profiling. see, e.g., My Yahoo! (visited July S. 2000) <http:// 
www.my.yahoo.com>;myCNN.com (visited July 8, 2000) <http://www.mY.CDlLcom>. 
129 See Henderson & 'l\verski, supra note 79. at 307 (noliag that "the order in which 
information is presented has a significant impact on its perception by the individU3l who 
must ultimately utilize the data to reach a decision"): Plut, supra note SO. at 1070 (arguing 
that manufacturers should be required to disclose information only when reasonable pa-
tient would find it material). 
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intended was six years old or sixty years old, certain sections of the 
IPR would be highlighted, allowing the IPR to be comprehensive 
enough to encompass most known risks while minimizing "overwarn-
ing" the patient. The IPR could be shown to the patient online, pref-
erably before the final order confirmation, so that the patient has a 
chance to review the pertinent risks of the medication before purchas-
ing it. Once the medication is ordered, the IPR could be printed out 
and delivered with the patient's order.130 
IPRs could effectively provide consumers who order drugs from 
prescribing-based sites with adequate warning information reasonably 
tailored to their individual profile, thus improving IJpOn the tnd;tionnl 
PPI. Of course, this printed information will in many cases be inferior 
to information received through personally consulting with a physi-
cian or by speaking directly to a dispensing pharmacist. Yet, mea-
sured against the quality of patient information typically provided in 
the current weakened state of the physician-patient relationship, this 
will not always be the case. 
b. A Case for Traditional Failure-to-Warn Liability. If manu-
facturers choose to implement IPRs as described above, traditional 
failure-to-warn liability analysis would provide manufacturers with the 
proper incentives to police the Internet prescribing phenomenon, en-
suring patient safety. In fact, it would be desirable if the exacting 
standards discussed in Part II.C.1.b prevented manufacturers from 
selling their medications to unscrupulous websites, distributing inade-
quate IPRs, or making particularly complex medications available to 
any website for online sale. Under this proposal, manufacturers will 
be free to partner with websites that they determine are reputable and 
create an extensive IPR program to accompany specific drugs they 
have deemed suitable for online sale. What the manufacturers must 
expect, however, is that the IPR thus created will be highly scrutinized 
under traditional failure-to-warn liability doctrine. The onus will be 
on the manufacturers to create the perfect IPR: readily understanda-
ble, sufficiently specific, and comprehensive. For certain medications 
this will be an impossible task, and liability concerns justifiably will 
prevent those medications from being sold online. Liability concerns 
will also deter manufacturers from selling their products to certain 
websites unable to implement an IPR program adequately. Likewise, 
130 Additionally. the printout could include a toll·free phone number that patients could 
use to contact a health care professional with any additional questions tbey might have. 
Such a help center could be maintained by the manufacturer as part of their obligation to 
provide the PPIs and could serve as the final opportunity for the patients to receive highly 
individualized information about their medication. 
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if these IPRs fail to improve upon traditional PPIs to any significant 
degree, this liability standard will restrict their use, thereby precluding 
manufacturers from relying on this method of disseminating warnings 
to patients to fulfill their duty to warn. 
Admittedly, a proposal to rely on IPRs as the sole source of drug 
information undoubtedly will encounter tremendous resistance from 
the medical community. In the absence of an extensive physician-pa-
tient relationship, creating IPRs that are sufficiently specific, yet thor-
ough enough to be the patient's primary information source, will be 
extremely difficult. At its most conservative, this proposal could-
and probably should-be used as an adjunct to the enhanced online 
physician-patient relationship described above. At its most ex1reme, 
such a proposal could force the reclassification of a particular class of 
medications to "quasi-prescription"; that is, medications that, based 
on their side-effect profiles, can be dispensed safely with a minimal 
amount of physician involvement and an adequate amount of patient 
information.131 The possible weighing of the advantages and disad-
vantages that would be associated with the creation of a class of 
"quasi-prescription" medications, on the basis of either increased ac-
cess or decreased cost, can only be debated once a feasible system for 
their distribution has been enabled. Regardless of whether a new 
class of "quasi-prescription" drugs ever arises, to the ex1ent that this 
proposal improves upon the quality of traditional PPIs, it undoubtedly 
can be implemented within our current scheme of drug distribution. 
B. Distributing Adequate Risk Information in Internet 
Prescribing Situations 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers are best situated to make certain 
that adequate risk information will be provided by websites that dis-
tribute drugs and thus contractually should obligate websites to imple-
ment the proposals discussed in Part m.A. As outlined in Part It it is 
unlikely that the government will be able to require all these sites, 
many of which are based in foreign countries, to distribute adequate 
patient warnings. The only common party to all of the sites around 
the world is the manufacturer, the source of all the medication sold on 
these sites, whether they are based in Boston or Bali. Since manufac-
turers are held to be experts on how their products are distributed,132 
131 Possible candidates may include prescription antihistamines suth as Clmtin or Al· 
legra. These medications have a low incidence of side effects and are aVDilable \\ithout a 
prescription in Canada. The side effect information required in an adequate patient warn· 
ing may be too complex for traditional over-the-counter labeliDg. but might be conveyed 
adequately in the manner proposed here. 
132 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
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they are required to know which of the wholesalers or pharmacies 
they currently deal with are involved with prescribing-based sites. In 
fact, federal regulations already require pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers to track the distribution of their products carefully. Manufacturers 
must keep lists of all authorized distributors for their products.133 Pre-
scription drug wholesalers must maintain detailed records of the com-
panies they deal with and "drug pedigrees" for medications they 
sell.134 Every drug manufacturer must have the capability to notify 
133 See 21 U.S.c. § 353(e)(1)(B) ("Each manufacturer of a drug ... shall maintdn at its 
corporate offices a current list of the authorized distributors of record of such a drug. "); 
see also Robert T. Angarola & Judith E. Beach, The Prescription Drug Marketing Act: A 
Solution in Search of a Problem?, 51 Food & Drug LJ. 21,41 (1996) (discussing adoption 
of regUlation by FDA). 
The possibility exists that drugs still may find their way onto the open market outside 
of authorized distribution channels, especially in poorly regulated foreign jurisdictions. A 
plaintiff injured in this situation who seeks to indemnify the manufacturer will have to 
show that the manufacturer's breach of its duty to warn was the proximate cause of her 
injury. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 15 cmt. e (1997) (noting 
that causal connection is required between defect and harm). When drugs are diverted 
criminally or fraudulently, this may be a difficult showing for the plaintiff to make since 
courts often find that criminal acts of third parties break the chain of causation. See, e.g., 
Port Auth. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 319 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that "the terrorists' 
actions were superseding and intervening events breaking the chain of causation," thus 
undermining plaintiffs' negligence claim); Gaines-Tabb v. lCI Explosives, USA, Inc., 160 
F.3d 613, 621 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that 
under comment b [of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 448], the criminal acts 
of a third party may be foreseeable if (1) the situation provides a temptation to 
which a 'recognizable percentage' of persons would yield, or (2) the temptation 
is created at a place where 'persons of a peculiarly vicious type are likely to be' 
and holding that criminal conduct of bombers was unforeseeable and broke chain of causa-
tion); Henry v. Merck & Co., Frl7 F.2d 1489,1495 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that "intervening 
factors [can break] the causal nexus between the original actor's careless behavior and the 
resulting injury" and that "(w]hen the intervening act is intentionally tortious or criminal, it 
is more likely to be considered independent"); McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 916 F. 
Supp. 366,369 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that: 
Plaintiffs' argue that because Olin [the ammunition manufacturer1 could have 
foreseen criminal misuse of its product, it should not have manufactured the 
ammunition. Plaintiffs do not allege, however, that any special relationship 
existed between Olin and Ferguson [the murderer who used ammunition made 
by Olin] that would give Olin the authority and ability to control Ferguson's 
actions. In the absence of such a relationship, New York courts do not impose 
a duty to control the actions of third parties.). 
134 See 21 U.s.C. § 353(e)(1)(A) (1994) (stating that wholesale distributors who are not 
authorized distributors of record must "provide to the person who receives the drug a 
statement ••• identifying each prior sale, purchase, or trade of such a drug"); 21 C.P.R. 
§ 205.5(a)(3) (2000) (stating minimum required information for licensure as wholesale pre-
scription drug distributor includes "addresses, telephone numbers, and the names of con-
tact persons for all facilities used by the licensee for the storage, handling, and distribution 
of prescription drugs"). These statements are commonly termed ·'drug pedigrees." Sec 
Angarola & Beach, supra note 133, at 41-43 (explaining drug pedigrees); see also 21 C.F.R. 
§ 205.50 (2000) (setting out requirements for drug sales by wholesale drug distributors). 
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"each of its affected direct accounts" about possible drug recaIls.135 
Also, since the websites maintain direct contact with the patient, forc-
ing them to distribute risk information through these contractual ar-
rangements alleviates many of the logistical difficulties previously 
mentioned.136 Therefore, as a precondition to selling their medica-
tions to a pharmacy or wholesaler that engages in Internet prescribing, 
manufacturers contractually should obligate purchasers to implement 
effective patient information systems.137 
1. Contractual Assignment of a Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's 
Duty to Warn 
. Once a manufacturer creates a comprehensive patient informa-
tion system, it then must obligate the websites to implement it effec-
tively. The leading case permitting a pharmaceutical manufacturer to 
assign its duty to warn contractually is Mazur v. ~ferck & CO.13S In 
Mazur, the Philadelphia health department purchased Merck's MMR 
IT vaccine for the city's immunization program.139 Merck sold the 
medication pursuant to a contractual provision obligating the United 
States Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to ensure that the vaccine 
would be administered (1) on the basis of an individualized medical 
judgment by a physician, or (2) \vith meaningful warnings, provided 
directly to the patient.l40 Pursuant to the latter provision, the CDC 
created an "Important Information Statement" informing patients in 
lay language of the risks of the vaccine, and obligated the Philadelphia 
health department to distribute the statement to vaccinees, or their 
135 21 c.F.R. § 7.49 (2000); see also Michael B. McMains & Catherine M. Morrison, The 
Impact of Technological Advancement on Pharmaceutical Company Liability. 30 Ind. 1.. 
Rev. 487, 489 (1997) (explaining recall requirements). 
13~ See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying texL 
137 As discussed in supra note 72, the purchaser could be :1 distributor or the website 
itself. The manufacturer either could contract directly with the website or with the distrib-
utor who would. in tum, contractually obligate the website to implement these S)'Stems. 
Th~ manufacturer should be able to bind foreign-based sites through these privnte con-
tracts as welL It is beyond the scope of this Note, bowever, to consider the possible juris-
dictional issues of enforcing such contracts. 
138 964 F.2d 1348 (3d Or. 1992). For another case bolding that Merck contractually 
could obligate the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to warn the ultimate user. see 
Walker v. Merck & Co., 648 F. Supp. 931. 935 (M.D. Ga. 1986), arret. 831 F.2d 1069 (11th 
Or. 1987); see also Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264.1276 (5th CII'.1974) ("[T]he manu-
facturer is required to warn the ultimate consumer. or to see tI,al/,e is wamed. " (emphasis 
added»; Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc.. 399 Fold 121, 131 (9th CII'. 1968) ("[I1t is the responsi-
bility of the manufacturer to see that warnings reach the consumer, either by giving warn-
ing itself or by obligating the purchaser to give warniog."). 
139 See Mazur. 964 F.2d at 1350. 
140 See id. at 1351. 
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parents or guardians.141 Applying the mass immunization exception 
to the learned intermediary rule,142 the court first held that Merck did 
indeed have an obligation to warn users directly of the risks of its 
vaccine.143 Applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388, how-
ever, the court also held that "a vaccine manufacturer may satisfy its 
duty to warn in the mass immunization context by obligating the CDC 
to warn users directly if it informs that agency of the facts which make 
its vaccine dangerous and reasonably relies on it to communicate such 
information to users in lay terms."144 The court first concluded that 
the package circular distributed with the MMR II vaccine was ade-
quate to inform the CDC of the dangers associated with the vac-
cine.145 The court also noted that Merck had researched the CDC 
carefully before agreeing to sell its vaccine and continually monitored 
the CDC's dissemination efforts.146 Finally, "[g]iven the resources 
and funding available to the CDC, as well as its expertise in immunol-
ogy and public vaccination," the court held that Merck reasonably re-
lied on the CDC to warn users of its vaccine directly.147 
In order to ensure that prescribing-based sites will distribute ade-
quate warnings, pharmaceutical manufacturers should draft contracts 
similar to Merck's contract with the CDC in Mazur. That is, manufac-
turers either coUld obligate the site to dispense their drug only after 
an individualized medical decision by an online physician, or require 
them to distribute meaningful patient warnings (Le., IPRs), thus ade-
141 See id. This arrangement is analogous to the proposal outlined supra Part III.A.2. 
142 See supra note 58. 
143 See Mazur, 964 F.2d at 1369. 
144 Id. at 1365. Under Pennsylvania law, the court noted that an unavoidably unsafe 
product under comment k is not considered under § 402A but under § 388, which requires 
the manufacturers to meet a standard of reasonableness, and not one of strict liability. See 
id. at 1364-66. 
145 See id. at 1367. 
146 See id. at 1368. 
147 Id. Admittedly, the heavily case-specific nature of the "reasonableness" test may 
lead courts to reach varying results. In Allison v. Merck & Co., 878 P.2d 948 (Nev. 1994), 
the plaintiff was injured in a similar situation by the same MMR II vaccine. See id. at 951-
52. Even though Merck contractually had obligated the CDC to warn the vDccinees, the 
court found that the CDC had "admitted biases against 'discourag[ing] the use of vac-
cines.'" Id. at 958 n.17 (alteration in original). Accordingly. the court reasoned that "a jury 
could conclude that Merck knew or had reason to know that the CDC was not going to 
provide the truth about Merck's product and did not, in fact, give proper warning." Id. 
Therefore, "Merck fully realized how inadequate the warning really was." Id. In a dissent-
ing opinion. Justice Young concluded that Merck reasonably relied on the CDC to formu-
late and distribute proper warnings for its vaccine. See id. at 968-69 (Young, J., dissenting). 
However, the ambiguity inherent in any reasonableness test can also be its strength. 
Courts adjudicating Internet prescribing cases will confront ever evolving technology. A 
reasonableness test will be flexible enough to encompass the widely varying fact patterns 
that courts are sure to encounter. 
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quately informing them of the pertinent dangers in the products. 
Mazur~s reasonableness test would encourage manufacturers to inves-
tigate these sites carefully, examining the site's credibility, the proce-
dures that it would use to implement a patient information program, 
and the resources that the site mayor may not have in place to create 
a proper physician-patient relationship. It would not be reasonable 
for a manufacturer to enter into such contracts with every prescribing-
based site, and the knowledge that dealing with an unscrupulous site 
may expose it to potential liability will discourage the manufacturer 
from dealing with such sites. A careful application of the },[aZlir test 
ensures that manufacturers maintain ultimate responsibility over the 
implementation of the warning system.148 
The reasonableness test also would limit the types of medications 
sold online, encouraging manufacturers to consider carefully whether 
it is reasonable for particular drugs to be distributed online.149 Manu-
facturers would also have the duty to visit these sites often to monitor 
the effectiveness of their warning efforts and to refuse to sell their 
medications to any sites that are not complying with their contractual 
obligations. 
Contractually obligating prescribing-based sites to distribute pa-
tient warnings is an efficient way to require these websites to improve 
their prescribing practices. By obligatirig certain prescribing-based 
sites to implement adequate patient s~eguards, some of the sites will 
become viable alternatives to the traditional drug distribution system. 
148 Courts that have addressed the delegation of the duty to warn by a pharmaceutical 
. manufacturer emphasize that the manufacturer must maintain ultimate responsibility over 
the warning system it chooses to implement See Petty v. United States. 740 F.2d 1428. 
1440 (8th eir.1984) ("Delegation of the duty [to warn] does not, in jtself. relieve the manu-
facturer ••• from liability for deficiencies in the manner in which the chosen intermediary 
effectuates the manufacturer's duty."); AUison. 878 P.2d at 959 ("[A]lthough a manufac-
turer may decide to assign its duty to warn of the unsafeness of its product to othars. a 
manufacturer cannot be relieved of ultimate responsibility for assuring that jts unsaIe prod-
uct is dispensed with a proper warning!'). In Petty. the U.S. govcrnment had assumed thc 
duty to warn about a swine flu vaccine from the vaccine manufacturar. See Petty. 740 F.2d 
at 1439-41. The court held that the government's warning was inadequate and therefore 
the manufacturer was liable. See id. at 1441 & 0.12. 
149 See Swayze v. McNeU Lab .• Inc.. 807 F.2d 464. 477 (5th Cir. 1987) (Goldberg, J •• 
dissenting) ("If McNeil [drug manufacturer) had preferred not to run the foreseeable risk 
of liability, McNeil could have changed the circumstances under which it provided the 
drug."). 
Though there are no large-scale studies available showing that telemedicine is as safe 
and effective as in·person consultations \vith a physician. II small study conducted by the 
Medical College of Georgia found no difference between the diagnoses pb)"Sicians made 
using a telecommunications link and those diagnoses they made in person. See '!Yler. 
supra Dote 96, at 279. For further discussion of telemedicine and possible medical malprac-
tice liability, see generally Kearney, supra note 29. at 300-02; Spielberg. supra note 29. at 
287-93. 
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Those sites that refuse to, or cannot, adhere to these contractual 
guidelines will be cut off from their drug supply by the manufacturers 
and will wither away. 
CONCLUSION 
Internet prescribing has the potential to put millions of consum-
ers at the risk of injury, presenting pharmaceutical manufacturers with 
a host of potential liability concerns. These concerns must be bal-
anced against the tremendous commercial possibilities and practical 
advantages offered by Internet prescribing. At this early stage, with 
the full potential of the Internet far from realized, it would be inadvis~ 
able and unnecessary for the government to place wholesale restric-
tions on prescribing-based websites. Instead, failure-to-warn analysis 
can be used as a framework for drug manufacturers to improve the 
quality and safety of Internet prescribing. By encouraging the devel-
opment of safer forms of Internet prescribing, instead of banning it 
entirely, the public can continue to benefit from the online health care 
revolution. 

